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ABSTRACT 
 
Alliance Coordination Effectiveness and the Performance of International Strategic 
Alliances: Development of the Partnership and Moderating Role of Market Environment 
Turbulence. (August 2004) 
Young-Tae Choi, B. A., Pusan National University, Korea; 
M.S., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Richard T. Hise 
 
The purpose of this dissertation was to investigate post-international strategic 
alliance (ISA) formation issues, which have been neglected in the ISA literature.  The 
specific research questions were 1) how do ISA partners develop their relationships? 2) 
how does this relationship development impact effective management of resources 
contributed by each ISA partner? and 3) how does effective resource management 
influence ISA performance?   
 Data were collected by mail and web surveys from those who were/are involved 
in ISA operations.  Structural equation modeling using LISREL was employed to test the 
conceptual model and multiple regression analysis was adopted to test the moderating 
effects in the model.  The model was modified by introducing second order factors to 
correctly interpret the relationships between factors and achieve a more parsimonious 
model. 
 Results indicate that alliance partnership interactions between ISA partners 
(i.e., reciprocity, transparency, formal and informal communication, two-way and 
 iv 
participative communication, and cultural sensitivity) positively influenced the 
development of desire for joint action between them which is based on trust and 
commitment.  Desire for joint action positively influenced alliance coordination 
effectiveness (ACE: integration and utilization of resources) which underlies effective 
resource management between ISA partners.  ACE positively affected ISA performance.  
Market environment turbulence (i.e., host government interference and technology 
turbulence), however, did not have moderating effects between ACE and ISA 
performance. 
 The first question was answered by introducing alliance partnership interaction 
factors which influence the building of the positive relationship between ISA partners.  
The introduction of ACE explained how ISA partners manage the resources provided by 
each partner.  The significant impact of ACE on ISA performance and the non-
significant impact of the moderating variables indicate that ACE has strong impact on 
ISA performance that can absorb the effects of host government interference and 
technology turbulence in the operation of ISAs. 
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1CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
  The benefits of international strategic alliances (ISAs), such as lowering 
production and research costs, entering new markets, strengthening market position in 
foreign markets, acquiring new managerial skills or technologies, increasing the level of 
local market and customer knowledge, and overcoming foreign government barriers, 
have prompted many firms to engage in these cross-border alliances (Contractor and 
Lorange 1988; Day 1995; Harrigan 1988; Hennart 1988; Ohmae 1989; Spekman, 
Isabella, and MacAvoy 2000; Varadarajan and Cunningham 1995; Yan 1998; Webster, 
Jr. 1991).  Based on Thomson Financial Securities Data, Kang and Sakai (2000) found 
that the number of new strategic alliances (both domestic and international, excluding 
franchising agreements) has increased approximately seven-fold during 1989-1999, from 
just over 1,000 in 1989 (of which around 860 were cross-border alliances) to 7,000 in 
1999 (of which around 4,400 were cross-border alliances).  This increase in the 
proportion of ISAs suggests that many firms have tried to achieve competitive advantage 
by forming ISAs with other firms in global markets.  The same study also shows that the 
majority of strategic alliances during 1990-1999 involved firms from North America 
(65%), Asia (33%) and Europe (28%), although rapid growth in alliances involved firms 
from China, Korea and other Asian countries.  Among strategic alliances during 1989-
1999, joint ventures occupied the highest percentage (approximately 48%), and 78% of 
the joint ventures were international.  
________________________ 
This dissertation follows the style and form of the Journal of Marketing. 
2Depending on whether equity is involved, alliances are categorized as equity 
alliances, which create a separate entity between the firms, or non-equity alliances, 
which do not create a separate entity or require future joint decision making beyond the 
life of the project (Dacin, Hitt, and Levitas 1997; Kang and Sakai 2000; Zahra and 
Elhagrasey 1994).  Equity joint ventures and minority equity investments (i.e., the 
purchase of a local firm by a foreign investor(s) to expand the operation of the local 
firm) are examples of equity alliances; marketing agreements, co-production contracts, 
exploration consortia, supply arrangements, and R&D collaborations are examples of 
non-equity alliances (Kang and Sakai 2000).   
The surge in ISAs caused many researchers to investigate several aspects of ISA 
phenomena: formation issues (advantages vs. disadvantages) (Contractor and Lorange 
1988; Harrigan 1998; Kogut 1988); factors, such as culture, control, ownership, and 
partner characteristics influencing stability (Dacin et al. 1997; Geringer and Herbert 
1991; Hu and Chen 1996; Yan 1998); relational factors, such as trust or commitment 
which affect partner relationships (Aulakh, Kotabe, and Sahay 1996; Cullen, Johnson, 
and Sakano 2000; Fey 1996; Sarkar, Echambadi, Cavusgil, and Aulakh 2001); and the 
eventual dissolution of ISAs (Reuer 1998, 2000).  Much of ISA research has explored 
how these various factors are related to or impact ISA performance (Aulakh et al.1996; 
Geringer and Herbert 1991; Sarkar et al. 2001).   
Despite the popularity of ISAs as a viable entry mode option for firms to achieve 
competitive advantage in global markets, and the consequent interest from researchers, 
the significantly high failure rate of ISAs, which has been estimated to be as high as 50-
370% (Day 1995; Dyer, Kale, and Singh 2001; Reuer 1998), and ISA research streams, 
which have focused mostly on the impact of the structural design of an ISA on its  
performance, need further research to enhance the understanding of ISAs (Gulati 1998; 
Yan 1998). 
Research Questions 
One of the most under-investigated ISA research areas is the management of an 
ISA after the ISA is initiated (Doz 1996; Yan 1998).  The ISA literature has tended to 
focus more on questions, such as why firms form ISAs, what factors are important for 
the ISA formation, and how these factors impact ISA performance (Gulati 1998).  Much 
of the ISA literature has dealt with the beginning and closing aspect of ISAs, that is, the 
initial structural design of ISAs and the consequent implications of the design for ISA 
performance (Hamel 1991; Yan 1998).  The emphasis on the beginning and end part of 
ISAs results in little research on the middle ground in which the partners cooperate to 
successfully manage their relationships in order to achieve their objectives (Aulakh et al. 
1996; Gulati 1998; Gulati, Khanna, and Nohria 1994; Reuer 2000; Simonin 1999).  
Alliance managers and researchers have not paid much attention to how alliance partners 
develop their relationships after an ISA is formed and how they effectively manage 
resources that each partner contributes to the ISA (Büchel 2002; Doz 1996; Gulati et al. 
1994).  
The above observations lead to under-studied but important ISA research 
questions: how do the partners develop their relationships and how can they manage the 
resources contributed by each partner to achieve their objectives and remain competitive 
4in the marketplace (Gulati 1998).  The ISA research has not fully provided insights into 
how ISA partners develop their relationships through which each partner can enhance 
the mutual understanding and cooperation and how the improved understanding and 
cooperation influences the pooling and capitalization of the resources contributed to the 
ISA to enhance ISA performance (Barringer and Harrison 2000: Simonin 1999; Yan 
1998).  
Though some researchers have addressed the importance of such relational 
factors as trust or commitment in developing ISA partner relationships and the impact of 
these factors on ISA performance, their research does not fully address how these factors 
are actually developed to ensure a successful partnership (Fey 1996; Luo 2002; Yan and 
Zeng 1999).  Their research also does not provide sufficient explanations as to how these 
factors influence the pooling of the resources contributed by each partner and how the 
partners effectively utilize the resources to achieve their ISA objectives.   
Objectives of the Research 
The increasing popularity but high failure rate of ISAs, the research needed on 
the ISA partner relationship development after ISA formation (i.e., the impact of the 
development on ISA performance and the lack of research on factors developing trust 
and commitment), and the resource management issues to achieve ISA objectives 
provide important rationales to investigate this research objective: how ISA partners 
develop their relationships and effectively manage ISA resources to achieve their ISA 
objectives.  Specifically, this research proposes the following research questions: (1) 
how do ISA partners develop their relationships? (2) does the relationship development 
5impact the management of the resources contributed by each partner? (3) does the 
management of ISA resources influence ISA performance?  
In order to investigate the research questions, a new construct, alliance 
coordination effectiveness (ACE), is introduced.  ACE is defined as “the extent to which 
alliance partners efficiently integrate the resources contributed by each partner and 
utilize the pooled resources to achieve the objectives of the alliance.”  The concept of 
ACE is developed from various theoretical foundations such as the resource-based view, 
the knowledge-based view, and the competence-based view and from the strategic 
management and marketing literature.  ACE is introduced to address how ISA partners 
increase the synergistic benefits of the alliance by which each partner can achieve its 
alliance objectives.  Trust and commitment, which have been recognized as important 
factors influencing interorganizational partner relationships, are presented as factors that 
directly impact ACE and indirectly influence ISA performance.  Reciprocity, 
transparency, communication frequency and efficacy, and cultural sensitivity are 
addressed as antecedents of developing a trusting partnership between alliance partners.  
Since external environment conditions can influence ISA partner relationships, market 
environment turbulence, that is, host government interference and technology 
turbulence, are introduced as moderators between ACE and ISA performance.    
Expected Contributions of the Research 
The purpose of this research is to provide insights into how ISA partners develop 
their relationships and effectively integrate and utilize the resources provided by each 
partner to achieve their alliance objectives.  ACE, other variables and their 
6interrelationships presented to address the research purpose are expected to contribute to 
the marketing literature. 
The first expected contribution is that this research explores one of the 
underinvestigated alliance research issues, the alliance relationship development process.  
Though the alliance relationship development process has been emphasized as one of the 
important alliance research topics, much of the alliance literature has focused on the 
initial formation issues and their implications for the alliance performance (Doz 1996; 
Gulati et al. 1994; Simonin 1999; Yan 1998).  By introducing trust, commitment, ACE, 
and market environment turbulence and their relationships for the development of the 
ISA partnership, this research addresses how alliance partners can successfully process 
and evolve into the successful relationships that help to achieve competitive advantage 
in ever-changing global markets.  This research is, therefore, expected to contribute to 
the alliance partnership process research.   
The second expected contribution is the introduction of the ACE concept to 
address the issue of resource management in the alliance context.  Because each alliance 
partner contributes its resources to other partners and tries to take advantage of other 
partners’ resources, the effective management of alliance resources is important for 
alliance partners to sustain their relationships and achieve their alliance objectives.  The 
introduction of the two dimensions of ACE (i.e., integration and utilization) is expected 
to provide theoretical contributions to the alliance management research by addressing 
the collective resource creation dimension (i.e., integration)  and the capitalization of the 
resource dimension (i.e., utilization).  The theoretical rationale about the two dimensions 
7is, therefore, expected to enhance the understanding of effective resource management, 
which is critical for the maximization of synergistic effects of alliance relationships and 
for the achievement of each partner’s alliance objectives. 
Organization of the Research 
This research is organized as follows.  Chapter I, as noted, introduces the 
research questions, the objectives, and the expected contributions.  In Chapter II, 
theoretical foundations underlying the development of ACE and the ISA literature are 
presented.  Different theoretical foundations—the resource-based view, the knowledge-
based view, and the competence-based view—are presented as underlying theories to 
provide a more thorough understanding of the development of ACE.   
In Chapter III, hypotheses are developed to investigate how ISA partners develop 
ACE and how ACE affects ISA performance.  Specifically, the hypotheses regarding the 
antecedents of ACE (i.e., trust and commitment), the factors affecting the development 
of ISA partner trust (i.e., reciprocity, transparency, communication, and cultural 
sensitivity), and market environment turbulence (i.e., host government interference and 
technology turbulence) as a moderator between ACE and ISA performance are 
proposed.  Chapter IV deals with methodology.  The collection and analysis of the data 
to test the hypotheses suggested in Chapter III are described in Chapter IV.  Chapter V 
and VI present the findings resulting from the data analysis, and Chapter VII provides  
discussion, implications for managers and researchers, and conclusion.  
 
 
 
 
 
8CHAPTER II 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Theoretical Background for the Development of Alliance Coordination 
Effectiveness 
An international strategic alliance (ISA) is defined as an interfirm cooperative 
strategic organization or agreement between two or more different country firms to 
achieve their strategic objectives by pooling their resources (Geringer and Herbert 1991; 
Lambe, Spekman, and Hunt 2002; Varadarajan and Cunningham 1995).  ISA resources 
comprise tangible and intangible entities such as know-how, information, capabilities, 
and technologies contributed by each partner to achieve the objectives of the ISA 
(Lambe et al. 2002).  Each ISA partner is basically involved in the processes of sharing, 
exchanging, transferring, and learning about each other’s resources through interactions 
and cooperation between the partners to maximize the alliance relationship.  The 
formation, operation, and exploitation of ISA resources and the development of ACE to 
achieve alliance success can be explained by the resource-based theory (Barney 1991; 
Peteraf 1993; Wernerfelt 1984), the knowledge-based theory (Grant 1996a, b 1997; 
Nonaka 1994; Steensma and Lyles 2000), and the competence-based theory (Sanchez 
1997, 2001; Sanchez, Heené, and Thomas 1996).   
The Resource-Based View (RBV) 
 The RBV assumes that a firm possesses heterogeneous resources, which enable 
it to generate above normal returns (Peteraf 1993).  A firm’s possession of 
heterogeneous resources drives it to form alliances to acquire resources it lacks because 
9the combination of unique resources in alliances can possibly bring about positive 
effects for the firm, which, in turn, can lead to a sustainable competitive advantage for 
alliance partners and above-normal economic returns to the participant firms 
(Lonrenzoni and Lipparini 1999).  The RBV also assumes that the complementary 
resources provided by alliance partners should be rare, imperfectly imitable, valuable, 
and nonsubstitutable to positively affect the higher performance of the alliance (Barney 
1991).  Resource constrained firms, thus, will have more chances of accomplishing value 
creation activities and reducing the uncertainty of the external environment by forming 
alliances (Varadarajan and Cunningham 1995).  It is, therefore, expected that alliances, 
through the mixture of idiosyncratic or complementary resources of each firm, will 
exercise more market power relative to their competitors and achieve competitive 
advantage (Varadarajan and Cunningham 1995).  Given diverse national and 
organizational cultures, unfamiliar market environments, and competitive global market 
situations, as well as the uncertainty of the foreign market in which ISAs operate, the 
pooling of heterogeneous and complementary resources from each ISA partner can be 
essential to achieve alliance success in the global markets.   
The RBV sees a firm as an entity that has a unique bundle of idiosyncratic 
resources and maximizes value through the optimal deployment of the resources (Grant 
1997; Wernerfelt 1984).  However, the idiosyncratic resources alone in the alliance may 
not be sufficient to achieve competitive advantage and above-normal returns for alliance 
partners because of complex market conditions.  Resources in alliance relationships can 
be combined, shared, transferred, and exchanged between alliance partners to create 
10
integrated and coordinated resources in order to achieve alliance objectives and bring 
higher performance to alliances (Chandler and Hanks 1994).  The viability and success 
of the partners can be enhanced through these processes (Barringer and Harrison 2000; 
Oliver 1997).  Though the RBV emphasizes the possession of unique or idiosyncratic 
resource and the optimal deployment of the resources to be competitive, it may not fully 
grasp how the resources that each alliance partner contribute to the ISA should be 
integrated and coordinated to establish the successful operation of the ISA and achieve 
long-term competitive advantage for the ISA.  The RBV may provide a theoretical 
perspective on the initial motives and formations of alliances, but it may not fully 
address how resources provided by each partner to the ISA can be integrated and 
transformed into effective alliance resources, which can positively enhance the ISA 
performance. 
The Knowledge-Based View (KBV) 
 The KBV is an extension of the RBV and sees a firm as a heterogeneous 
knowledge-bearing entity in which a firm's stock knowledge can be an important factor 
for the firm's competitive advantage (Grant 1996b, 1997; Grant and Baden-Fuller 1995; 
Hoskisson, Hitt, Wan, and Yiu 1999).  The KBV argues that the role of an organization 
is to integrate knowledge (Grant and Baden-Fuller 1995) and that "an organization's 
idiosyncratic know-how and its ability to replicate and exploit knowledge are 
fundamentally responsible for organizational success"(Steensma and Lyles 2000, p. 
836).  Integrated knowledge (i.e., not knowledge itself) is the critical source of a firm’s 
competitive advantage (Grant 1996a).  A firm forms alliances because it can better utilize 
11
its internal knowledge and acquire the knowledge resources of other firms (Grant 1997).  
An alliance, thus, can be an efficient vehicle by which a partner can learn about other 
partners’ knowledge, providing it with a chance of adding new knowledge to its existing 
knowledge base (Grant 1996b).   
While the RBV emphasizes the maximization of value creation through the 
optimal deployment of each firm’s idiosyncratic resources (Grant 1996a), the KBV sees 
the integration of knowledge as the most strategically important element for 
organizational success (Grant 1997).  The KBV emphasizes the effective coordination of 
knowledge within alliance relationships so that alliance partners can achieve a 
sustainable competitive advantage for alliance success (Lonrenzoni and Lipparini 1999).  
The coordination of each partner’s knowledge can allow alliances to apply the integrated 
knowledge to commercial ends (Cohen and Levinthal 1990).  The integrated knowledge, 
in turn, can minimize the impact of uncertainties from alliances’ external environments 
and achieve congruence with changing business situations (Lane, Salk, and Lyles 2001; 
Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 1997).  Alliances, therefore, can be an efficient entity for firms 
to exchange, reconfigure, and coordinate each partner’s knowledge by which each firm’s 
knowledge can be developed into integrated alliance knowledge to achieve its 
competitive advantage, meet competition, match the requirement of a changing 
environment, and enhance the higher possibility of alliance success (Teece et al. 1997).  
The RBV and the KBV  
 Both the RBV and the KBV provide good theoretical foundations to explain 
ACE needed for successful alliance operations.  Each partner should not only contribute 
12
its unique resources to alliances but also integrate the resources most efficiently to 
alliance objectives.  When an alliance becomes a competent organization through the 
integration of resources provided by each partner, alliance partners can have better 
control of resources and also have a higher chance of achieving their alliance objectives 
(Lorenzoni and Lipparini 1999; Sanchez 2001).  
From the above arguments, it can be contended that the RBV and the KBV are 
not isolated theoretical frameworks that explain the development of ACE.  They are 
complementary in explaining how alliances can develop effective relationships and 
successfully manage the resources contributed by each alliance partner.  The RBV 
provides the basic premises of motives for alliance formation.  The heterogeneous 
resources each partner possesses induce firms into alliance formation, which is a basic 
tenet of ACE.  However, the RBV does not extensively explain how the resources each 
partner contributes should be integrated and utilized to positively influence alliance 
success.  On the other hand, the KBV focuses on knowledge integration in alliance 
relationships (Hoskisson et al. 1999).  The KBV argues that alliance partners coordinate 
their activities to maximize the combination of each partner’s knowledge for alliance 
success.  The emphasis of coordinated processes to create integrated resources between 
alliance partners by the KBV, thus, provides an underlying theoretical rationale to 
develop ACE. 
The Competence-Based View (CBV) 
 The last theoretical perspective to explain the development of ACE is the 
competence-based view (Sanchez 1997, 2001; Sanchez et al. 1996).  The CBV sees 
13
competence as “the ability of an organization to sustain coordinated deployments of 
assets and capabilities in ways that help the organization achieve its goals”(Sanchez et 
al. 1996, p. 8).  For the CBV, “assets are anything tangible or intangible the firm can use 
in its processes of creating, producing, and/or offering its products (goods or services) to 
the market…Capabilities are repeatable patterns of action in the use of assets to create, 
produce, and/or offer products to a market”(Sanchez et al. 1996, p. 7).  A firm is a goal- 
seeking system of tangible and intangible assets deployed to achieve the firm’s goals and 
is characterized by an open system of asset stocks and flows (Sanchez 1997, 2001).  The 
firm as an open system tries to achieve its strategic goals by identifying and coordinating 
internal resources within the firm and acquiring external resources through interaction 
with other firms (Sanchez 1997).  Through the systematic and coordinated processes of 
internal and external resource integration and deployment, firms can continuously 
leverage their existing resources and build their competitive advantage to achieve their 
strategic goals.  
The CBV also emphasizes the environments surrounding the organization as 
evolving, dynamic and changing conditions to which the organization should be 
strategically flexible in order to achieve its goals (Sanchez et al. 1996).  A strategically 
flexible firm can recoordinate resources within the firm and from other firms and 
redeploy and reallocate the resources to the firm’s advantage (Sanchez 2001).  The 
flexible management of the firm, thus, enables the firm to more readily detect and 
respond to the uncertainties of changing market conditions.   
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The CBV and Alliances 
 Strategic alliances encompass or carry out all or part of value creating activities 
through exchange, sharing, learning and co-development of new relationships between 
partners (Gulati 1998; Reuer 1998; Varadarajan and Cunningham 1995).  The 
construction of collaborative relationships through such activities allows alliance 
partners to enhance their competitive position and maintain sustainable cooperative 
relationships with their partners (Samdasani and Sheth 1995).   
The collaborative activities emphasized between alliances partners by the CBV 
can be another theoretical foundation to develop ACE.  An alliance provides an 
opportunity for its participant firms to create new assets and capabilities by cooperating 
with the partners (Sanchez et al. 1996; Tallman 1999).  Alliance partners provide their 
unique but constrained assets and capabilities to enhance their competencies that may 
not be obtained through an individual firm’s market activities (Tallman 1999).  By 
participating in an alliance, the partners will increase the chance of achieving their 
success in the market through coordinated resource deployment between them, which 
allows the alliance to be more flexible to external environments, compete with other 
firms, and achieve competitive advantage in the marketplace (Lambe et al. 2002; 
Sanchez 1997; Spekman et al. 2000).   
The Role of the Theoretical Foundations for the Development of Alliance 
Coordination Effectiveness 
The RBV focuses on the acquisition of each alliance partner’s valuable 
resources, which allows them to generate a competitive position in the market (Lane et 
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al. 2001).  The RBV, however, does not provide more complex theoretical foundations 
which address how alliance participant firms actually manage the resources from each 
partner to achieve their competitive position (Barringer and Harrison 2000).  Because the 
RBV emphasizes the motivations for alliance formation and the static acquisition of 
resources from each alliance partner, it does not consider much how alliance partners 
develop their relationships and cooperate to effectively manage the resources contributed 
by each partner after the alliance is formed.   
On the other hand, the KBV and the CBV focus on the processes of interlinking 
each partner’s resources through the integration and proper deployment of the assets and 
capabilities between alliance partners.  The processes of integration and deployment of 
partner resources facilitate cooperation and interaction between alliance partners to learn 
and improve the understanding about each partner.  The emphasis of the dynamic 
processes could help the partners identify and develop new assets and capabilities and 
provide them with more opportunities to respond to changing market conditions.  
Alliances thus cope better with their external environment changes by developing new 
resources through integration and coordination between alliance partners. 
 In summary, the three theories lay foundations to form alliance relationships and 
utilize the resources contributed by each partner.  The RBV provides a fundamental 
rationale to form alliances (i.e., to acquire other firms’ resources that a firm does not 
possesses).  The KBV and the CBV provide theoretical bases to explain resource 
coordination between alliance partners to create a collective resource base and utilize the 
resources to implement its strategies and achieve its objectives.  Therefore, these 
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theories can be the foundations to develop the concept of ACE and the implications for 
the alliance. 
Research on ISA Performance 
Despite a long interest in understanding and measuring ISA performance, the 
research on ISA performance is still complex and challenging (Anderson 1990; Ariño 
2003; Gulati 1998; Luo 2002; Yan and Gray 1994).  The multifaceted nature of 
performance measures (e.g., what measures should be evaluated), the various 
constituents of performance evaluation (e.g., whose views should be measured: the 
parent firm or ISA managers), and the situations in which ISAs operate make the correct 
evaluation of ISA performance difficult, leading to non-consensus on the correct 
measures of ISA performance (Geringer and Herbert 1991; Gulati 1998; Yan and Zeng 
1999).  However, without an accurate assessment of what ISAs have achieved, the 
parent firm or ISA managers can’t objectively evaluate the quality of their strategic 
decisions for ISA operation (Chakravarthy 1986).  It is, therefore, essential that 
researchers develop proper performance measures of the ISA to correctly evaluate the 
health of the alliances and ensure that the maximum value from the ISA can be obtained 
for the partners.  
Despite the incongruence of the ISA performance measures, researchers have 
used three extensive measures: financial measures (e.g., return on investment, return on 
sales or assets, sales growth, market share, etc)(Aulakh et al. 1996; Calantone and Zhao 
2000; Luo 2002), non-financial measures (e.g., survival, duration, exit, high quality 
products, competitiveness, etc)(Barkema, Shenkar, Vermeulen, and Bell 1997; 
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Chowdury 1992), or combinations of both financial and non-financial measures (Cullen 
et al. 2000; Ding 1997; Killing 1983; Geringer and Herbert 1991; Mjoen and Tallman 
1997)(Table 1 shows a brief overview of the research on ISA performance).  
Financial vs Non-Financial Performance Measures 
Many ISA researchers have extensively used financial measures because the 
measures can explicitly reveal the economic health of an ISA.  The use of these 
measures, however, potentially causes problems due to the lack of standardization in 
international accounting conventions, difficulty in obtaining objective financial data, and 
the diverse partner objectives in ISAs (Chakravarthy 1986; Dess and Robinson 1984; 
Woodcock, Beamish, and Makino 1994).  Different accounting practices between 
countries may not allow for the correct comparisons of financial performance measures 
between ISAs, which makes it difficult to evaluate their financial performance.  ISA 
parent firms also usually do not disclose valid and reliable financial data about their 
subsidiaries (Anderson 1990; Venkatraman and Ramanjuam 1986).  Without the 
appropriate data from the parent firms, researchers also may have difficulty in accurately 
evaluating the ISA financial performance.  The use of financial performance measures, 
thus, can be relevant only when researchers can get the objective financial data that 
support specific financial objectives of an ISA (Ariño 2003).  However, ISA objectives 
are not limited to the achievement of financial goals.  ISA objectives can include non-
financial ones such as technology acquisition, preemption of foreign markets, product 
line diversification, acquisition of partner marketing skills and services, or improvement 
of product design or quality (Ariño 2003; Geringer and Herbert 1991; Varadarajan and  
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                Table 1: Selected ISA Performance Research: Performance Measures, Key Factor(s) Influencing  
                                                           Performance, and Key Findings or Arguments 
Author(s) Performance Measures Key Factor(s) Key Findings or Arguments 
Killing (1983) Subjective: IJV managers’ 
perception of IJV performance  
Objective: liquidation, major 
reorganization (e.g., new 
product line)  
Control Dominant parent control of IJVs 
outperform shared management 
IJVs(the same result between 
subjective and objective measures). 
Beamish (1985) Parent firm management 
assessment of IJV operation 
satisfaction 
 A greater managerial dissatisfaction in 
JVs in less developed countries than in 
developed countries. A strong 
correlation between unsatisfactory 
performance and dominant foreign 
control in less developed countries.  
No performance differences between 
IJV partner number.  
Anderson (1990) Subjective measures   IJVs as stand alone entities in 
performance measurement. Objective 
financial measures are only one 
dimension of IJV performance 
measures. 
Geringer and 
Herbert (1991) 
Objective: survival, stability, 
and duration  
Subjective: the parent firm or 
the IJV managers’ satisfaction 
with overall performance of the 
IJV.   
Cultural similarity Positive correlations between 
subjective and objective measures.  
Positive correlations between the 
parents’ and IJV managers’ 
satisfaction.  Positive relationships 
between cultural similarity and IJV 
performance. 
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Table 1 : Continued 
Chowdury(1992) Objective non-financial: exit 
rate, longevity, stability of 
ownership status, integration 
with the parent system, export 
sales, and factor usage (the 
number of employees) 
Entry mode  
(the IJV  vs  the WOS) 
Relative superior performance of IJVs 
or WOSs based on specific 
circumstances 
Inkpen(1994) The parent firms’ overall 
satisfaction with IJV 
performance (failure: early or 
unplanned terminations, 
moderate: still exist but partner 
conflict, success: well 
functioning without considering 
termination). 
Equity share and control No performance differences based on 
equity share.  No relationships 
between dominant control and 
superior venture performance.   
Yan and Gray 
(1994) 
The IJV’s achievement of its 
strategic objectives measured by 
the IJV or the parent firm 
managers 
Control Different objectives between the 
foreign (eg., profits) and the local 
partners(e.g., technology acquisition). 
The same performance assessments 
between the JV managers and the 
parent managers. Higher performance 
by equally shared control.  
Aulakh, Kotabe, 
and Sahay(1996) 
Upper management’s evaluation 
of sales growth and market 
share relative to competitors’ in 
distribution and license 
partnerships  
Trust, relational norms, 
and monitoring 
mechanisms 
The positive impact of the norms and 
the mechanisms on trust.  Trust itself 
does not have a direct impact on 
performance.  The positive impact of 
relational norms (flexibility and 
continuity expectations) and informal 
control on performance. 
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Table 1 : Continued 
Fey (1996) IJV managers’ evaluation of 
overall performance of the IJV 
Trust between IJV and its 
parent, long-term 
commitment by parents, 
empowerment to workers, 
parents’ agreement of 
contribution 
The positive impact of trust between 
the IJV and its parent firm(s), a clear 
understanding of the parent roles, 
empowerment for IJV local managers, 
and long-term commitment on IJV 
performance. 
Hu and Chen 
(1996) 
Success vs non-success 
(objective: high quality 
products, profits and export 
revenue 
Partner commitment, 
foreign control, number of 
partners, & cultural 
distance 
The positive impact of the number of 
partners, culture, and commitment on 
performance.  No significant impact of 
control on performance. 
Lyles and 
Salk(1996) 
IJV managers’ business 
measures (e.g., volume growth, 
achieving planned goals, and 
profits), competencies/human 
resources (e.g., training and 
management skills), and a 
general evaluation  
Knowledge acquisition 
from foreign parent 
High correlations between the IJV 
managers’ and the foreign parent 
managers’ assessments of IJV 
performance. The positive relationship 
between knowledge (tacit and explicit) 
acquisition from the foreign parent 
and IJV performance.  
Makino and 
Delios(1996) 
Top Japanese IJV managers’ 
categorical assessment of 
financial performance (loss, 
breakeven, and gain) 
Foreign parent’s host 
country IJV experience, 
the foreign parent’s past 
host country experience, 
and the local partner 
existence 
The positive impact of partnering with 
local firms and of the foreign parent 
experience in the host country on IJV 
performance. The declining effect of 
the increased foreign parent’s IJV 
experience with local partners on IJV 
performance. 
Barkema, 
Shenkar, 
Vermeulen, and 
Bell (1997) 
Longevity IJV or IWOS experience, 
cultural distance, 
domestic JV experience 
The positive impact of domestic JV 
and IWOS experience on 
performance. No positive impact of 
IJV experience on performance. A 
negative relationship between cultural 
distance and performance. 
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Table 1 : Continued 
Ding (1997) A parent firm’s satisfaction with 
IJV performance (financial and 
non-financial) 
Control and conflict The positive impact of dominant 
control by foreign partners (US) on 
performance.  The negative impact of 
conflict on ISA performance  
Mjoen and 
Tallman(1997) 
The parent firm managers’ 
perception of their IJV 
performance (satisfaction, to the 
extent of objective achievement, 
and a profitable investment) 
Control The positive effect of overall control 
(not equity share) of the IJV on IJV 
performance.  . 
Park and Ungson 
(1997) 
Duration of IJVs Cultural distance, partner 
firms’ strategic diversity ( 
age, size, and scope), and  
rivalry of partner 
firms(direct competitors) 
No impact of cultural distance and 
partner firms’ strategic diversity on 
duration.  IJVs with direct competitor 
partner firms are less likely to endure.  
Lin and Germain 
(1998) 
IJV partner managers’ 
satisfaction(personal 
relationship with the other IJV 
party, financial performance, , 
and the overall IJV relationship) 
Cultural similarity, 
relative power(the 
capability to influence the 
other party’s decision) 
The positive impact of cultural 
similarity between partners on 
performance.  No relationship between 
relative power of partners on 
performance.  Significant impact of 
the age of IJV on performance. 
Calantone and 
Zhao(2000) 
Top IJV managers’ subjective 
IJV financial performance 
achievement  (ROI, ROE and 
sales growth)  
Control The positive impact of control of 
major functional areas on performance 
(IJVs between the US or Korean firms 
and Chinese firms) or no impact (IJVs 
between Japanese and Chinese) of 
control on performance. 
Cullen, Johnson, 
and Sakano 
(2000) 
ISA top managers’ evaluation 
of alliance objective 
achievement (financial and non-
financial) 
Trust and commitment The higher the trust and commitment, 
the higher the alliance performance 
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Table 1 : Continued 
Steensma and 
Lyles(2000) 
IJV survival  Parent firm conflict  Negative impact of imbalance control 
by parent firms on IJV survival. No 
equity share difference influence on 
survival.  Positive impact of foreign 
parent firm support for technical 
know-how on parental conflict and 
IJV survival. 
Li, Lam, and 
Qian(2001) 
Objective: ROA, sales per 
employee, and asset growth 
Culture No impact of culture on ownership.  
More significant effects of 
technological resources and well-
established brand names than those of 
culture on IJV performance in China. 
Sarkar, 
Echambadi, 
Cavusgil, and 
Aulakh(2001) 
Non-equity collaborative 
ventures’ perceived strategic 
performance (SP: strategic and 
learning objectives) and project 
performance (PP: profitability, 
efficiency, client satisfaction, 
and project quality) 
Complementarity 
(resource, culture, and 
operation) and mediators, 
(relationship capital: trust, 
commitment, and 
information exchange) 
Positive direct/indirect impact of 
resources on PP. Indirect impact of the 
resources on SP through relationship 
capital. Indirect positive impact of 
culture on PP through the capital. 
Direct /indirect positive impact of 
culture on SP. Positive indirect impact 
of operation on PP. Negative direct 
impact of operation on SP.  
Luo(2002) Objective financial data (ROI 
and sales per asset)  
Trust The positive moderating effects of 
younger (age) alliance, more uncertain 
market conditions, and higher 
reciprocal commitment on the trust-
ISA performance relationship. No 
moderating effects of cultural distance 
on the relationship (no culture 
influence on ISA performance once 
trust is established). 
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Table 1 : Continued 
Pothukuchi, 
Damanpour, 
Choi, Chen, and 
Park (2002) 
Local (Indian) partners’ 
satisfaction with joint ventures, 
efficiency (financial and 
product), and competitiveness 
(against competitors) 
National culture and 
organizational culture 
A positive impact of national culture 
distance on efficiency and 
competitiveness.  A strong negative 
effect of organizational culture 
distance on satisfaction.  No 
significant influence of the interaction 
between national and organizational 
culture distance on IJV performance. 
Robins, Tallman, 
and  
Fladome-
Lindquist 
(2002) 
Subjective strategic outcomes 
by ISA managers 
(growth, sales, meeting strategic 
goals) 
Strategic resources from  
foreign firms, local 
resources(marketing and 
labor: Mexico), and 
operating resources by 
foreign firm 
Positive (or negative) influence of 
strategic (or operating) resources and 
local labor on performance via 
services and product quality. Direct 
positive impact of local resources on 
performance and indirect positive 
impact on performance via human 
resource development in ISAs. 
Note: ISAs: international strategic alliances (equity IJV and non-equity alliances). IJV: international joint venture,  
          (I)WOS: (international) wholly owned subsidiary 
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Cunningham 1995).  Since each partner firm may have different objectives that it wants 
to achieve in ISAs, the differing objectives of each partner make the financial 
performance of ISAs an incomplete measure of the true economic health of the ISAs 
(Ariño 2003).   
In summary, despite the extensive use of financial measures, the lack of 
availability of accurate financial data, different accounting systems across countries, and 
the possible differing objectives of the partners do not allow the financial measures of 
ISA performance to fully reflect overall performance dimensions of ISAs, but represent 
only one dimension of ISA performance (Anderson 1990; Geringer and Herbert 1991). 
ISA researchers often use non-financial measures to evaluate ISA effectiveness such as 
liquidation, major reorganization (e.g., equity renegotiation), exit rate, termination, high 
quality products, longevity (e.g., survival or duration), and competitiveness (Barkema et 
al. 1997; Geringer and Herbert 1991; Gulati 1998; Inkpen and Beamish 1997; Killing 
1983; Pothukuchi et al. 2002). These non-financial measures can reflect various partner 
objectives and stability of an ISA not related to financial objectives (Yan and Zeng 
1999).  Though these non-financial measures allow researchers to measure different ISA 
objectives and stability, it is questionable whether the longevity-related measures (i.e., 
survival, duration, exit, termination, etc.) can be valid measures of ISA performance 
(Inkpen 1998).  For example, ISAs can be terminated earlier than expected by the 
partners’ mutual agreement after they achieved their objectives, high exit or termination 
costs may deter a withdrawal from ISA operation, or an ISA itself can be a transitory 
organization for its parent firm due to the nature of the firms’ objectives in the ISA 
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(Inkpen 1994; Gulati 1998). Therefore, though the longevity-related measures can 
objectively reflect the temporal stability/instability of an ISA, they do not truly reflect 
adequate measures of ISA performance (Ariño 2003).  
The combination of both financial and non-financial measures can capture a wide 
variety of ISA performance dimensions that ISA partners try to achieve in ISA 
relationships.  The wide use of diverse measures would provide researchers with an 
improved lens to understand and evaluate the diverse objectives of ISAs from various 
performance aspects.  Since the objectives of many ISAs are not limited to either 
financial or non-financial ones, it would be appropriate for researchers to evaluate both 
financial and non-financial aspects of ISA performance given the multidimensional 
aspects of ISA performance measures.  Researchers, such as, Killing (1983), Geringer 
and Herbert (1991), Ding (1997), and Sarkar et al. (2001), used a combination of 
financial and non financial measures to evaluate multidimensional ISA performance 
aspects.  It can be contended that the combinations of financial and non-financial 
performance measures are generally used to evaluate multifaceted ISA performance 
dimensions.  
Objective vs Subjective Measures 
 Whether researchers evaluate the performance of ISAs by using financial or 
non-financial measures or both of these measures, the performance criteria can either be 
objective measures, which use data from public information sources or firms, or 
subjective measures in which researchers ask for the parent firm or ISA managers’ 
perception of their ISA performance.  Though financial measures of ISAs through 
 26
published information can evaluate the economic health of ISAs, the measures may not 
be directly comparable across different countries, industries, and stages in ISA life 
cycles as previously stated (Osland and Cavusgil 1996).  Various accounting systems 
and different classifications of industries in countries and diverse objectives other than 
financial goals would make it difficult to adopt objective financial measures as proper 
ISA performance measures.  Other objective measures, such as duration, survival, exit or 
termination also may suffer from the validity issue of using the measures as previously 
indicated.  Subjective performance measures (e.g., satisfaction with performance) from 
the parent firm or ISA managers can also pose the problems of finding appropriate 
managers who can correctly evaluate their ISA performance and the inherent weakness 
of the self-evaluated performance(i.e., not objectively evaluated) (Osland and Cavusgil 
1998).  
The above arguments regarding the multidimensional performance measures of 
an ISA do not lead to agreed performance measures of ISAs.  However, research shows 
that objective and subjective alliance performance measures are strongly related, which 
allows objective measures to be used as a substitute for subjective measures, or vice 
versa (Dess and Robinson 1984; Geringer and Hebert 1991).  It also would not pose a 
great concern regarding whose perspectives are measured to evaluate alliance 
performance because performance evaluations between parent firm managers and 
international joint venture (IJV) managers are also strongly related (Geringer and Hebert 
1991; Lyles and Baird 1994; Yan and Gray 1994). 
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Based on the above observations of the ISA performance measure literature, this 
research adopts the performance of ISAs as the achievement of strategic objectives of 
each partner from the perspective of the parent or ISA manager (Cullen et al. 2000; Yan 
and Gray 1994).  This view of ISA performance evaluation is an integrated 
measurement, which tries to measure each partner’s objectives by using financial and/or 
non-financial performance criteria and different manager perspectives from either the 
parent firm or the ISA.  The measures are subjective measures, which may suffer from 
the self-reporting problem.  However, since objective and subjective measures are 
closely related (Geringer and Herbert 1991), subjective measures from various 
managers’ perspectives will reflect the multifaceted performance evaluation of ISAs. 
Factors Influencing ISA performance 
ISA researchers have used a wide variety of factors that can affect ISA 
performance.  The various factors are so wide in scope that it is difficult to limit as to 
what factors influence and how the factors exactly affect ISA performance (Roboson, 
Leondiou, and Katisikeas 2002).  However, commonly cited factors contributing to ISA 
performance are  cultural similarity or distance, control (i.e., which partner firm controls 
the operation), ownership(i.e., equity share), prior experience of ISA participant firms 
(international experience, ISA experience, or host country experience), the number of 
participant firms, the resources that each partner contributes to the ISA (e.g., resource 
complementarity), and organizational culture (e.g., senior management support), and 
trust or commitment (Roboson et al. 2002)(see Table 2).  The external environment 
changes, such as industry characteristics (e.g., new competitors) and government 
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pressures (e.g., policy changes), are also addressed as factors influencing ISA 
performance (Blodgett 1991; Yan 1998; Yan and Zeng 1999).  Since the impact of these 
factors on ISA performance varies depending on ISA conditions, such as, locations (eg., 
countries) or industries in which ISAs operate or on ISA types (e.g., vertical vs 
horizontal alliances), it is not easy to generalize to what extent these factors affect ISA 
performance and how these factors work together to influence the performance 
(Dussauge and Garrette 1995; Dussauge, Garrete, and Mitchell 2000; Roboson et al. 
2002; Yan 1998). 
Research Gaps in the ISA Literature 
Much research on the impact of the wide variety of factors on ISA performance 
have contributed to enhancing the understanding of the complex management and 
operational aspects of ISAs.  However, the complexities of ISA relationships still require 
further research to improve understanding of the successful operation and management 
of ISAs. 
One of the underinvestiagted research areas in the ISA literature is relationship 
development between the partners after an ISA is formed and how the development 
affects ISA performance (Doz 1996; Yan 1998).  It is important to understand the initial 
structure of the ISA and how the structure impacts the success of the ISA.  However, 
since interorganizational organizations develop and experience the processes of 
cooperation and involve interaction to shape theirs strategic courses and establish the 
quality relationship, it may be worthy of investigating how ISA partners develop their 
relationships after the ISA is formed (i.e., what are important to further develop their 
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successful relationships after the ISA is formed) and how these relationships affect ISA 
management (Gulati 1998; Hutt 1995: Niederkofler 1991; Yan 1998; Wilson 1995).  
Unfortunately, the prolific ISA literature has not sufficiently investigated how ISA 
partners should develop successful interpartner relationships and how relationship 
development influences the ISA operation.  Since alliance partners can evolve into 
negative or positive relationships as they go through various processes, research on how 
ISA partners develop their partnerships and how relationship development can impact 
ISA management would add a theoretical rationale to enhance the research on alliance 
process.    
Another research area in the ISA literature is the resource management of ISA 
partners.  The partners basically look for the necessary resources from their alliance 
partner firms, which requires the processes of exchanging, sharing, combining, 
redeploying, and learning about each partner’s resources to achieve alliance objectives.  
The questions arise: How can ISA partners effectively manage the resources each 
partner contributes to the ISA?  Will the effective management of these resources result 
in the achievement of alliance objectives?  What are the factors facilitating effective 
resource management?  The premise underlying these questions assumes that ISA 
partners have positive working relationships to effectively manage through interaction 
and cooperation between them.  The ISA literature does not fully indicate how ISA 
partners effectively create a collective resource base that can be utilized to achieve their 
alliance objectives.   
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ISAs are often subject to complicated and unexpected foreign market conditions, 
such as changing market situations and host government regulations on foreign 
operations, that a firm did not experience in the domestic market.  The impact of external 
environments on ISA operation, however, has not received much attention from 
researchers.  Since external market environment factors can affect a firm’s strategies and 
performance, it would be enlightening to investigate how they can influence ISA 
management and operation and how they can impact ISA performance (Blodgett 1991; 
Slater and Narver 1994). 
The impact of trust on interfirm relationships has been extensively investigated 
(Aulakh et al. 1996; Anderson and Narus 1990; Morgan and Hunt 1994; Wilson 1995).   
Many ISA studies assume that trust directly influences ISA performance (Luo 2002; 
Madhok 1995; Sarkar, Cavusgil, and Evirgen 1997; Whipple and Frankel 2000).  The 
extensive research of trust in ISA contexts has not focused much on the factors 
facilitating the development of a trusting relationship after the ISA is formed (e.g., not 
based on the initial structures) and the possible indirect impact of trust on ISA 
performance (Aulakh et al. 1996; Morgan and Hunt 1994).  It may be necessary to 
understand what factors help ISA partners develop trust and whether trust in alliance 
relationships can indirectly affect the performance of the alliance.  
The research gaps substantiate the introduction of the new concept of alliance 
coordination effectiveness (ACE).  The introduction of the ACE construct would allow 
this research to investigate the processes of the development of the alliance partnership 
after the ISA is formed and the impact of this development on the effective management 
 31
of each partner’s resources, which eventually affects the performance of the ISA.  Trust 
would be dealt with as a variable which indirectly influences the performance of the ISA 
via ACE.  The impact of external environments on ISA operation would enrich the 
theoretical understanding of the complexities of ISA operation. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
CONCEPTUAL MODEL AND DEVELOPMENT OF RESEARCH  
 
HYPOTHESES 
 
Alliance Coordination Effectiveness: The Construct and Its Dimensions 
 
The Construct 
Alliance coordination effectiveness (ACE) encompasses the processes of 
recognizing, sharing, exchanging, transferring, combining, and learning about each 
alliance partner’s idiosyncratic and complementary resources to generate an alliance 
competitive advantage that can’t be obtained by a firm alone in the marketplace.  The 
ACE construct is, thus, based on the assumption that each partner firm contributes its 
unique resources to the alliance and it should coordinate its activities with the partner 
firm to collect a variety of resources and capitalize on the resources in order to maximize 
the alliance relationship benefits.  
 Figure 1 provides a conceptual framework, which illustrates the relationship 
between trust, commitment, and ACE; antecedents (reciprocity, transparency, and 
communication, and cultural sensitivity) of trust; the relationship between ACE and ISA 
performance; and the moderating role of market environment turbulence between ACE 
and ISA performance.  The research investigates how ISA partners can improve ISA 
performance through enhancing ACE.  ACE is assumed to improve ISA performance.  
Market environment turbulence is modeled as a moderator influencing the relationship 
between ACE and ISA performance.  Trust and commitment, the two most compelling 
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Figure 1 
  Alliance Coordination Effectiveness and the Performance of International Strategic Alliances:  
Development of the Partnership and Moderating Role of Market Environment Turbulence 
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factors influencing the partner relationship in interorganizational relationships, are 
assumed to positively influence ACE and trust is assumed to positively influence 
commitment.  Reciprocity, transparency, communication, and cultural sensitivity are 
presented as factors which impact trust in an ISA relationship.   
Dimensions of Alliance Coordination Effectiveness and ISA Performance  
  There are two dimensions of alliance coordination effectiveness (ACE): 
integration and utilization.  Integration refers to the extent to which alliance partners 
undertake coordinating activities to create a collective resource base for the partners to 
employ.  Integration refers to the activities of alliance partners to synthesize, 
synchronize, exchange, share, and transfer a variety of knowledge and capabilities and 
find new ways of using the resources (Hoopes and Postrel 1999).  The integration 
process complements the lack of each partner’s resources, transforms explicit and tacit 
resources into articulated ones, and generates a new collective resource pool for strategic 
purposes of the alliance.  Integration is also beyond a routine and simple relationship 
beneficial to the partners.  Integration is a process in which the partners have an explicit 
and acknowledged stake in the other’s success and view the alliance relationship as an 
asset that creates value for each other (Johnson 1999).  Since the essence of an 
organizational capability is to integrate specialized individual knowledge, the purpose of 
integration is to maximize the potential of knowledge and skills from each partner and 
exploit the unexplored potential of the knowledge and skills from each partner (Grant 
1997; Hamel 1991; Kogut and Zander 1992).  To generate the most valuable and optimal 
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resources within the ISA, the partners add, delete, and combine their resources (Zahra 
and George 2002).   
Successful integration is based on “mutual forbearance” and formal and informal 
procedures in which different knowledge or skills are combined by solving partner 
conflict (Buckley and Casson 1988).  The steady exchange of information  
between the partners and the development of social relations between them that go 
beyond a narrow self-interest and opportunism may also be needed for successful 
integration (Larson 1992).  Though many alliance resources are generally “internally 
sticky” and “tacit,” the collaborative processes of integration can transform each 
partner’s knowledge and skills into an alliance capability, which allows an ISA to 
appropriate higher rents (Kogut and Zander 1992; Nonaka 1994; Szulanski 1996).  
Successful integration creates a new collective resource pool and value for the alliance 
through effecting transformation, which is fundamental to creating a sustainable 
competitive advantage (Grant 1996a).  Successful integration is, therefore, a precursor 
for a successful partner relationship in the alliance.  The above arguments regarding 
integration lead to the following hypothesis: 
H1a: The greater the integration of activities related to pooling of resources  
         in an international strategic alliance, the higher the performance of the     
         alliance.  
    
Utilization refers to the extent to which alliance partners undertake coordinating 
activities to capitalize on the pooled resources to accomplish the strategic objectives of 
the alliance in the target market(s).  Utilization is the ability of an alliance to effectively 
harness resources from each partner to successfully implement its market strategy (Grant 
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1997; Moorman 1995).  Utilization results from the collective learning and strengths of 
the alliance relationship, helping the alliance productively use the newly collective 
resources to maximize the achievement of alliance strategic goals (Das and Teng 2000; 
Inkpen and Beamish 1997).  Utilization is not only the retrieval of the integrated 
resources for the creation of new capabilities but the employment of such capabilities for 
a sustainable period of time, resulting in the enhancement of new strategic initiatives to 
better compete in the global marketplace (Zahra and George 2002).   
Utilization is the actualization of each partner’s tangible and intangible resources 
into alliance outputs based on joint and coordinated efforts between alliance partners.  
The knowledge and skills of each partner, which are internalized and embedded into 
alliance resources, are used to exploit market opportunities, carry out alliance strategies, 
and generate a relational rent, defined as “a supernormal profit jointly generated in an 
exchange relationship that cannot be generated by either firm in isolation and can only 
be created through the joint idiosyncratic contributions of the specific alliance partners” 
(Dyer and Singh 1998, p. 662).  When an alliance is able to develop and execute specific 
market strategies, the alliance can pursue its intended market objectives in a stable 
manner (Noble and Mokwa 1999).  Utilization, therefore, comprises the processes that 
efficiently exercise the collective resources created by the partners in the market to 
achieve alliance objectives.  Utilization becomes one of the key indicators of alliance 
capabilities that help an alliance remain competitive in the market (Majumdar 1998).  
The above arguments made about utilization lead to the following hypothesis: 
 H1b: The greater the utilization of the pooled resources in an international    
          strategic alliance, the higher the performance of the alliance. 
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Market Environment Turbulence: Moderating Effects on the Relationship Between 
ACE and ISA Performance 
When ISA partners operate an ISA, they may face a turbulent market 
environment.  Turbulent market environments set boundary conditions on the ISA’s 
performance by constraining the ISA’s resources and competitive landscapes (Sarkar, 
Echambadi, and Harrison 2001; Slater and Narver 1994).  These environments can 
disrupt or facilitate the flow of information, values, and processes between interfirm 
partners and put the partners either in more difficult or more cooperative decision-
making situations, which can influence the optimal partner relationship (Achrol 1991; 
Johnson 1999).  ACE is, thus, contingent upon the understanding of how these turbulent 
market environments affect an ISA because the ISA must align itself to its environment 
if it is to succeed (Blodgett 1991; Nath and Newell 1998).  In order to understand how 
turbulent market environments influence the operation of an ISA, host government 
interference and technology turbulence are employed as measures of market 
environment turbulence and moderators which impact the relationship between ACE and 
ISA performance. 
Host Government Interference (HGI) 
HGI refers to the extent to which an ISA host country government intervenes in 
the operation of the ISA (Blodgett 1991; Roboson et al. 2002).  A host country 
government can influence the operation of an ISA in several ways, such as, changing its 
regulations about foreign direct investment by adding new restrictions on the operation 
of foreign firms in certain industry sectors, or requiring a higher equity share for the 
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local partner firm in the ISA operation.  The host country government can also demand 
the hiring of more local workers and the procurement of certain local components or 
products and insist upon a higher level of control over specific activities by the local 
partner firm in the ISA (Gomess-Casseres 1990; Mjoen and Tallman 1997; Yan 1998).  
HGI may postpone the effective operation of the ISA by interfering in the ways that 
cause ISA partners to modify the initial contractual agreements (e.g., renegotiation of 
equity share), redefine ISA objectives and strategies, and reconfigure the internal 
operational structure of the ISA.  The processes of sharing, combining, exchanging, or 
deploying the resources provided by each partner to accomplish ISA objectives can also 
be delayed or reorganized to meet these government requirements.   
Since these interferences are more likely to favor the local ISA partner firm, they 
can shift the relative bargaining power to the local firm.  This shift may hamper the 
effective cooperation with the foreign ISA partner firm and can be a source of conflict 
between ISA partners (Yan 1998; Yan and Gray 1994).  The process of complying with 
these interferences, therefore, not only requires considerable expenditure and time for 
ISA partners but also constrains the availability of ISA resources and limits the 
implementation of ISA strategies, which may cause instability in the ISA (Lorange 1996; 
Yan 1998).  Based on the above arguments, the following hypotheses are suggested: 
H2a: The greater the host government interference in an international strategic     
         alliance, the weaker the relationship between the integration of activities   
         related to pooling of resources and the performance of the alliance. 
 
H2b: The greater the host government interference in an international strategic  
         alliance, the weaker the relationship between the utilization of the pooled           
         resources and the performance of the alliance. 
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Technology Turbulence 
Technology turbulence refers to changes in technology in the market (Calantone, 
Garcia, and Dröge 2003; Kohli and Jaworski 1990).  A turbulent technology market is 
one in which the market changes over time (i.e., dynamic), market conditions are volatile 
(i.e., not easy to predict), and firms have difficulty conducting orderly business because 
of changing technologies in the market in which an ISA operates (Chakravarthy 1997).   
When technology in the market or industry is changing, these changes require 
alliance partners to cooperate in order to accommodate the changes in the operation of 
an alliance (Calantone et al. 2003).  An alliance should monitor technology advances or 
innovations and react effectively to these changes to provide enhanced value to its 
customers.  If not, the alliance can’t remain competitive in the market (Sarkar et al. 
2001a).  Because an alliance which can deal with changing technologies can provide 
novel products and services to be competitive in the market, the monitoring of 
technology turbulence and adjusting to this turbulence is essential for the alliance to 
develop appropriate strategies by which alliance partners can effectively integrate and 
utilize their alliance resources to achieve alliance objectives.  Technological changes, 
therefore, necessitate the coordination of alliance partners in creating closer and stronger 
links to cope with the changing technologies in the market (Jap 1999).  These changes 
make it necessary for the alliance to effectively share, exchange, allocate, and deploy its 
resources and implement market strategies based on its pooled resources to successfully 
achieve alliance objectives.   
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H3a: The greater the technology turbulence, the stronger the relationship between  
         the integration of activities related to pooling of resources and the  
         performance of the international strategic alliance. 
 
H3b: The greater the technology turbulence, the stronger the relationship  
       between the utilization of the pooled resources and the performance of the  
         international strategic alliance. 
 
Building Alliance Coordination Effectiveness: The Role of Trust and 
 
Commitment 
 
Trust and commitment have been studied as important variables influencing 
successful partner relationships (Anderson and Narus 1990; Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 
1987; Madhok 1995; Morgan and Hunt 1994; Sivasdas and Dwyer 2000; Wilson 1995).  
Since every issue or contingency that can arise in an ISA operation can’t be addressed in 
contracts or agreements, trust and commitment become more important for maintaining 
a satisfactory alliance partner relationship (Cullen et al. 2000; Madhok 1995).  Different 
organizational and national cultures, unique management philosophies and practices, and 
the importance of learning from ISA partners add to the significance of trust and 
commitment in ISA relationship management (Cullen et al. 2000; Luo 2002; Madhok 
1995; Yan 1998).  Trust and commitment, therefore, are addressed as two key factors 
influencing ACE in ISAs. 
Trust and Alliance Coordination Effectiveness   
Trust is the extent to which an alliance partner has confidence in its partner(s) 
(Aulakh et al. 1996; Morgan and Hunt 1994).  Trust is one of the most important 
partnership factors that firms and strategic alliances should develop to remain 
competitive in the global marketplace (Cullen et al. 2000; Doney, Cannon, and Mullen 
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1998; Madhok 1995).  Trust is a participant firm’s belief that the partners can be relied 
upon because they act with integrity, honesty, reliability, and consistency in ways that 
generate positive outcomes (Anderson and Narus 1990; Whipple and Frankel 2000).  
Trust implies the belief that the partners will not engage in unexpected and negative 
actions.  The participant firm believes that its partners do not take advantage of it or do 
not carry out their current and future obligations only for their own interests (Mohr and 
Spekman 1994).  Trust is the participant’s credibility in its partners that the partners have 
the intent, ability, and motivation to provide good marketing intelligence and will make 
their promised contributions to the ISA (Cullen et al. 2000; Maltz and Kohli 1996).   
There is always a possibility in alliances that each partner puts its own goals over 
other partners’ goals, which leads to opportunistic behavior of the partner (Aulakh et al. 
1996; Madhok 1995).  In a trusting ISA relationship, however, this opportunistic 
behavior is restrained because trust fosters a spirit of cooperation and facilitates a low 
level of hierarchical governance because trust can be a substitute for hierarchical control 
by developing a stock of goodwill and reducing monitoring costs between alliance 
partners (Barringer and Harrison 2000; Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995).  The trust-based 
alliance, thus, allows for more interaction, enhances mutual concern for benefits, 
develops the continuity expectation of the ISA on a long-term basis, and cultivates more 
information exchanges between the partners (Aulakh et al. 1996).  
Once trust is established, each partner can have faith in the other partner’s 
strategic intentions and can better learn how to coordinate tasks (Madhavan and Grover 
1998).  Trust, thus, improves the “chemistry” between the partners through which they 
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can willingly rely on each other due to the increased level of confidence between them 
(Moorman, Zaltman, and Deshphande 1992; Rodríguez 2002).  This reliance enhances 
the incentive to promote a more cooperative atmosphere between the partners, which 
works as an extraordinary lubricant to improve alliance management (Gulati 1998).  
The need for ISAs to remain competitive in the global marketplace may cause 
conflict between partners due to cultural differences, inherent opportunistic behavior 
tendency, and market situation changes.  Conflict between the partners hinders mutual 
cooperation, producing intolerance and reluctance to exchange market knowledge.  Trust 
between ISA partners, however, reduces opportunism, fosters partner tolerance, 
facilitates knowledge exchanges, and encourages a cooperative atmosphere (Luo 2002).  
Trust, thus, makes it easier for the partners to harness knowledge and skills contributed 
by each partner, which helps to increase the use of the resources to achieve the strategic 
objectives of the ISA (Nonaka 1994).  Drawing on the above arguments, it can be 
expected that if trust exists between alliance partners, it is highly possible that 
recognition and identification of valuable and necessary partner resources would be 
facilitated, allowing them to more easily create resources for successful alliance 
operation and goal achievement.  Trust can foster an “open” alliance in which each 
partner can easily access to and absorb valuable resources, skills, and knowledge, which 
makes the alliance better able to create a collective resource pool available for the 
partners and the resources can be optimally used to accomplish the objectives of the 
alliance.  
H4a: The higher the trust in an international strategic alliance, the greater the   
         integration of activities related to pooling of resources  in the alliance.  
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H4b: The higher the trust in an international strategic alliance, the greater the  
         utilization of the pooled resources in the alliance. 
 
Antecedents of Trust 
 
Reciprocity, transparency, communication (frequency and efficacy), and cultural 
sensitivity are presented as antecedents influencing trust in ISAs.  Since these variables 
are important in maintaining interorganizational relationships (Griffith and Harvey 2001; 
Johnson, Cullen, Sakano, and Takenouchi 1996; Hamel 1991; Hu and Korneliussen 
1997; Mohr, Fisher, and Nevin 1996), they are proposed to affect the development of 
trust between the partners in an ISA.  
Reciprocity.  The first antecedent of trust is reciprocity, which refers to “a 
mutually contingent exchange of benefits between two or more units” (Gouldner 1960, 
p. 164).  Reciprocity is based on a common understanding in an exchange relationship 
that each has rights as a beneficiary to get benefits from its partners and obligations as a 
benefactor to pay back the benefits to the partners (Hu and Korneliussen 1997).  
Reciprocity is the basic rule of behavior in social exchange situations, mutually 
reinforcing each partner’s actions to build a successful exchange relationship (Oliver 
1990; Parkhe 1993; Wade-Benzoni 2002).  Reciprocity also positively influences a 
building of cooperative alliance relationships (Kogut 1989; Parke 1993; Rindfleisch and 
Moorman 2001).  Reciprocity, however, is more calculative in nature (Luo 2002).  
Reciprocal actions are taken in response to actions by other firms in an exchange 
relationship (Frazier, Gill, and Kale 1989).  The partner firm’s level of effort in the ISA 
relationship is related to its perceived effort of its partners (Ruyter and Wetzels 2000).  
For example, manufacturers’ use of coercive (vs.  noncoercive) strategies is related 
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positively to the dealers’ use of coercive (vs. noncoercive) strategies (Frazier et al. 
1989). 
The basic norm of reciprocity in social relationships requires that 1) people help 
those who have helped them and that 2) people should not injure those who have helped 
them (Gouldner 1960, p. 171).  The basic requirement posited is that a firm, which 
received benefits from another firm, is morally and economically obligated to 
reciprocate to the other firm’s previous actions and share other economic opportunities 
with that firm (Chung, Singh, and Lee 2000).  Though to reciprocate generally means to 
return in kind, the reciprocal benefits provided by a beneficiary firm do not necessarily 
have to be commensurate or equitable with the benefits the firm received from other 
firms in an interorganizational relationship (Brett, Shairo, and Lytle 1998).  In 
interorganizational relationships, the benefits that are offered in response to other firms’ 
actions are generally not easy to quantify because the tacit, idiosyncratic, and 
complementary nature of resources do not provide for exact value comparisons of the 
resources exchanged (Nonaka 1994).  The perceived fairness of resource and skill 
exchanges between ISA partners, therefore, would be a core component of reciprocity in 
the ISA relationship (Hu and Korneliussen 1997).   
Since reciprocity emphasizes cooperation rather than power, control, and 
domination for successful interorganizational exchanges (Oliver 1990), each partner can 
have a deep sense of involvement in which a feeling of “solidarity,” defined as a 
bilateral expectation that a high value is placed on ISA relationship maintenance, is 
created and more interactions between the partners can be expected (Heide and John 
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1992, p. 36; Linton 2000).  The reciprocal atmosphere reduces monitoring costs, allows 
partners to easily detect and remedy free-riding problems, and hinders manipulative 
actions by partners (Brett et al. 1998).  Reciprocity also carries out the function of 
rewarding a partner in the case of altruistic behavior and penalizing the partner when it is 
“defecting” from mutual agreements, mutual support, balance, and perceived fairness 
(Kogut 1988).  The defecting partner not only loses the confidence of partner firms, but 
creates an “imbalanced reciprocity” situation in which opportunistic behaviors occur and 
the potential for retaliation is heightened (Chung et al. 2000; Kashlak, Chandran, and 
Benedetto 1998; Kogut 1988). 
Reciprocity provides an incentive for ISA partners to cooperate, resulting in 
additional chances for creating value-generating activities and laying a foundation upon 
which to build a stable and harmonious partner relationship (Hu and Korneliussen 1997; 
Kogut 1988).  The tit-for-tat process of reciprocal exchanges in ISAs is, therefore, an 
important lubricant for inducing a better understanding of the partners and a willingness 
for them to collaborate and foster a trusting partner relationship.  Greater levels of 
reciprocal knowledge exchanges between ISA partners can thus improve integrity, 
reliability, and faith in the alliance, gaining confidence of the partners.  Reciprocity, 
therefore, provides the basis for a trust-building process in interorganizational 
relationships.  Drawing on the arguments made about reciprocity, the following 
hypothesis is suggested: 
H5: The greater the reciprocity in an international strategic alliance, the  
       higher the trust in the alliance.  
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Transparency.  The second antecedent of trust is transparency, which is defined 
as to the extent to which the resource exchange between alliance partners is open (Hamel 
1991).  Transparency is an exchange process between alliance partners by which 
decisions, behaviors, and intentions of the partners are made readily visible, clear, and 
comprehensible to each other (Hamel 1991).  A transparent partner relationship suggests 
that necessary information, know-how, and ideas are exchanged between the partners 
and delivered to them without guile, distortion, obfuscation, or manipulation (Hamel 
1991; Moenaert, Caeldries, Lievens, and Wauters 2000).  The transparent relationship 
also indicates that each partner keeps the other informed about events or changes that 
can impact the other party or not use the information solely for its own benefit (Heide 
and John 1992).  The transparent relationship, however, does not mean that each partner 
should entirely open its resources to the partners.  Each partner sometimes should say 
‘no’ to a request from its partners for access to core resources to protect these resources 
(Hamel 1991).  The transparent process indicates that relevant and credible knowledge, 
skills, and information that are necessary for the partner should be clearly and 
understandably delivered to it, allowing it to easily absorb and use the resources in order 
to achieve ISA objectives.  Any activities and responses of the partner in an alliance also 
should be readily understood by its partners so as not to cause any unnecessary doubts 
about the partner’s behavior so that each partner enhances the understanding of each 
other’s strategic intentions (Cohen and Levinthal 1990).  Since much of knowledge, 
skills, or information from the partner is often tacit and deeply embedded in the specific 
partner firm (e.g., marketing know-how, local knowledge, or negotiation skills with local 
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government), it hampers smooth transitions between alliance partners (Simonin 1999).  
A transparent relationship between the partners, thus, becomes important in 
understanding and absorbing these resources to make good and informed decisions 
(Janson 2002).  
When a high level of transparency exists between alliance partners, it may 
potentially reduce transaction costs, facilitate diffusion of ideas, make the transfer of 
knowledge between the partners easier, and efficiently allocate resources between them 
(Eggert and Helm 2003; Hamel 1991; Jenkins and Floyd 2001).  Transparency forges 
new bonds between the alliance partners in which opportunistic behaviors of the partners 
are restrained, which can increase the possibility of learning from the partner (Lamming, 
Caldwell, Harrison, and Phillips 2001).  Transparency, therefore, helps alliance 
participant firms reduce “uncertainty” about the partner firm and creates a “relational fit” 
between the partners (Eggert and Helm 2003; Hamel 1991).  Accordingly, a transparent 
relationship between alliance partners builds faith and goodwill in the partners’ actions.   
On the other hand, a lack of transparency can cause fissures in an 
interorganization in which interaction between the partners takes time and each partner 
may begin to have suspicions about whether its partner has “a hidden agenda” (Zhao, 
Kim, and Du 2003).  A low level of transparency between alliance partners, thus, creates 
an atmosphere in which each partner may not clearly understand the intents and 
behaviors of its partners, which does not foster a trustful solidarity between the partners 
(Hamel 1991; Heide and John 1992).  As a result, the lack of transparency does not 
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establish confidence in alliance partners.  Drawing on the above arguments, the 
following is hypothesized about the relationship between transparency and trust in ISAs. 
H6: The greater the transparency in an international strategic alliance,   
       the higher the trust in the alliance.  
 
Communication 
Communication has been recognized as a facilitating and compelling factor in 
interorganizational relationship success because communicated knowledge can be a 
source of competitive advantage for the interorganization (Anderson and Narus 1990; 
Gassenheimer, Baucus, and Baucus 1996; Tucker, Meyer, and Westerman 1996; Walker 
and Reukert 1987).  Generation, acquisition, sharing, dissemination of market 
information, and timely response to information through communication, bring about 
organizational learning (Baker and Sinkula 1999; Kohli and Jaworski 1990; Narver and 
Slater 1990). Communication plays an important role in facilitating the development of 
interorganizational partner relationships and works as the glue to hold together channel 
members (Mohr and Nevin 1990; Mohr et al. 1996).   
            Communication between alliance partners facilitates the exchange and sharing of 
necessary information, guards against opportunism, helps to solve conflict between the 
partners, and creates a positive relationship (Mohr and Spekman 1994; Sarkar et al. 
2001b).  Communication is an alliance asset that enables alliance partners to learn from 
each other and coordinate their tasks, helping the alliance develop and maintain a viable 
relationship between the partners.  Since many ISA failures are a result of cultural and 
organizational misunderstandings, different views on control, and lack of efficient 
knowledge exchange mechanisms (Hu and Chen 1996; Yavaş, Eroğlu, and Eroğlu 
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1994), the development of effective intercultural communication skills is essential in 
enabling ISA partners to deal with these problems and develop a satisfactory partner 
relationship (Griffith and Harvey 2001).  The development of such communication skills 
may facilitate the development of relevant, timely, and credible information and 
knowledge exchanges between ISA partners (Bandyopadhyay, Robicheaux, and Hill 
1994; Griffith and Harvey 2001; Yavaş et al. 1994). 
 To understand how specific communication dimensions impact trust in an ISA 
context, frequency and efficacy dimensions are introduced.  The impact of specific sub-
dimensions, such as, formal/informal, participative, and bi-directional communication 
has been introduced in channel relationships (e.g., manufactures and distributors: 
Anderson and Narus 1990; Mohr and Spekman 1994), marketing and engineering 
relationships (Fisher, Maltz, and Jaworski 1997), retailing (Mohr and Sohi 1995), and 
franchise relationships (Gassenheimer et al. 1996).  These subdimensions are divided 
into two dimensions--frequency and efficacy--in order to observe how they affect trust in 
ISAs. 
Communication Frequency.  The number of formal and informal contacts 
between alliance partners is communication frequency, which emphasizes the quantity of 
communication (Anderson and Narus 1990; Fisher et al. 1997; Maltz and Kohli 1996; 
Mohr and Nevin 1990; Parke 1993).  Formal communication, defined as the extent to 
which communications flow through written and formal rules and standardized 
procedures (Walker and Ruekert 1987), reduces role conflict and ambiguity of channel 
members (Mohr and Nevin 1990), guards against alliance partner opportunism 
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(Dahlstrom and Nygaard 1999), and positively influences cross-functional cooperation 
and group consensus (Menon, Bharadwaj, Adidam, and Edison 1999).  Formal 
communication also inhibits distrust between channel members by reducing withholding 
and distortion of necessary information (Mohr and Sohi 1995).   
Informal communication refers to more personalized and spontaneous 
communication between alliance partners, such as, “hallway talk”', “word-of-mouth”, or 
any ad hoc communication (Mohr et al. 1996).  Informal communication within an 
interorganization provides more opportunities for each partner to adjust to the needs of 
its partners and allows the organization to more quickly adapt to new market 
opportunities (Heide and Miner 1992; Walker and Ruekert 1987).  Informal 
communication also enhances openness of the organization, which reduces the 
possibility of opportunistic behavior of partners, clarifies the roles of each partner, and 
provides more opportunities for them to understand each other (Maltz and Kohli 1996). 
In summary, a greater number of contacts through formal and informal 
communication can result in a higher level of bonding between alliance partners.  This 
higher bonding can enhance the credibility of information exchanged and facilitate the 
exchange of shared objectives between the partners (Tucker et al. 1996).  Frequent 
communication between alliance partners can, thus, increase the level of understanding, 
facilitate shared experience, foster a more cooperative atmosphere, and promote future 
interactions between them (Heide and Miner 1992; Tucker et al. 1996).    
However, too much contact can degrade the quality of communication or be 
counterproductive because of information overload problem and confusion about the 
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credibility of information and knowledge (Maltz 2000; Maltz and Kohli 1996).  Frequent 
communication, thus, may not get enough attention from alliance partners because too 
much information between the partners may reduce the reliability of the exchanged 
knowledge and information.  Frequent communication, therefore, may not provide a 
truly cooperative atmosphere for alliance partners.  Frequent formal and informal 
communication is therefore a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for promoting 
trust in an ISA (Fisher et al. 1997).    
The above two arguments regarding frequency of communication can be 
contradictory with regard to its effects on trust in an alliance.  However, the situations 
which ISAs experience throughout the operation of an ISA, such as, different cultural 
and organizational backgrounds, lack of market knowledge, market situation changes, 
and the uncertainty of ISA success make the positive effects of frequent communication 
likely to override the negative effects of frequent communication.  The environment in 
which ISAs operate may require more frequent formal and informal communication 
between the partners to learn more about each other and respond to changing ISA 
circumstances.  Therefore, the following hypotheses are suggested: 
H7a: The greater the formal communication in an international strategic   
         alliance, the higher the trust in the alliance. 
 
H7b: The greater the informal communication in an international strategic  
         alliance, the higher the trust in the alliance. 
 
Communication Efficacy.  Two-way (i.e., bi-directional) and participative 
information exchange between alliance partners are communication efficacy 
(Gassenheimer et al. 1996; Fisher et al. 1997; Mohr and Spekman 1994).  Two-way 
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communication is the extent to which an alliance partner gives instantaneous feedback 
and input to its partners (Anderson, Lodish, and Weitz 1987; Fisher et al. 1997).  Since 
misunderstandings due to language barriers, different cultures, and unique organizational 
practices may hinder appropriate exchanges of market information or ideas between ISA 
partners, the feedback or input, both positive and negative, through bi-directional 
communication can give the partners an opportunity to clarify communication 
exchanges, verify the assumptions of decisions, and provide the partner perception of its 
partner’s performance (Anderson et al. 1987; Fisher et al. 1997).  Two-way 
communication also provides more opportunities for sharing accurate and credible 
information between manufacturers and distributors and increasing communication 
satisfaction between interorganizational partners (Mohr and Spekman 1994; Mohr and 
Sohi 1995).   
 Another dimension of communication efficacy is “participative 
communication,” defined as the extent to which an alliance partner engages in a joint 
decision-making process (Mohr and Spekman 1994).  Participative communication 
allows alliance partners to join in goal setting and adjustment for relevant and timely 
information exchanges.  These exchanges help the partners clarify partnership objectives 
and mutual operational plans, as well as mitigate conflict and opportunism in alliance 
relationships (Gassenheimer et al. 1996; Mohr and Spekman 1994).  Since the partners 
can participate in co-operation of the alliance, the feeling of shared responsibility and 
task comprehensibility can be increased.  Through participation in ISA’s market 
decision-making processes, each partner can have a feeling of involvement, which 
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strongly motivates the partners to achieve alliance objectives, and provide “volitional 
compliance” for a cooperative alliance partnership (Anderson, Lodish, and Weitz 1987; 
Mohr et al. 1996, p.103).   
Drawing upon the arguments made about communication, we can conclude that a 
focus only on the frequent formal and informal communication dimensions may limit the 
understanding of the diverse communication facets in an alliance relationship (Fisher et 
al. 1997).  Efficient communication through two-way and participation between the 
partners provides opportunities to enhance alliance partner relationships.  It can be, 
therefore, reasonably assumed that two-way and participative communication foster an 
atmosphere or build a foundation where alliance partners can depend more on each other 
so that their mutual understanding increases and a trusting alliance partner relationship is 
established (Siguaw, Baker, and Simpson 2003). 
H8a: The greater the two-way communication in an international strategic  
         alliance, the higher the trust in the alliance. 
 
H8b: The greater the participative communication in an international strategic  
         alliance, the higher the trust in the alliance. 
 
Cultural Sensitivity.  The extent to which ISA partners adapt to the cultural 
differences between them in the ISA is defined as cultural sensitivity (Johnson et al. 
1996; Skarmeas, Katsikeas, and Schlegelmilch 2002).  Cultural sensitivity requires the 
development of awareness, understanding, and appreciation of cultural differences 
between ISA partners, and the accommodation of the differences into harmonious 
partner relationships (Harich and LaBahn 1998).  Since each ISA partner brings its own 
distinctive business and social practices (e.g., etiquette or procedures) to the ISA and 
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cultural distance between ISA partners creates additional difficulties and challenges for 
ISA managers in developing their relationships, it is important for ISA partners to 
develop cultural sensitivity to achieve a trusting relationship.  For example, a lack of 
cultural sensitivity between ISA partners easily leads to the feeling of a lack of common 
ground or expectations between the partners, which can cause misunderstandings, 
suspicion, and conflict in the roles, behaviors and work between them (Skarmeas et al. 
2002).  Misunderstanding, suspicion, and conflict also foster opportunistic tendencies for 
the partners and cause impediments to the process of knowledge transfer between them 
(Johnson et al. 1996; Simonin 1999).  Without cultural sensitivity, therefore, ISA 
partners may not easily develop smooth interpersonal relationships, which hinders the 
creation of positive interactions between them (Lin and Germain 1998).  
When ISA partners have cultural sensitivity, however, they can quickly adapt to 
“a third culture” of an ISA in which unique cultures are mingled with the host country’s 
different cultural environment (Casnir 1999).  Cultural sensitivity allows the partners to 
learn the cultural differences between them quickly in order to facilitate the development 
of satisfying relationships, which restrains opportunistic behaviors between ISA partners 
(Harich and LaBahn 1998; Skarmeas et al. 2002).  Cultural understanding and 
adjustment to different cultures in an ISA relationship indicates that the partner cares 
about its partners, the congruence in organizational philosophies and values between the 
partners is facilitated, and managerial discrepancies between the partners are easily 
handled (Sarkar et al. 2001b).  Cultural sensitivity of ISA partners, therefore, allows for a 
cooperative partnership in which the partners develop trust between them (Johnson et al. 
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1996; Sarkar et al. 2001b).  The arguments made about cultural sensitivity lead to the 
following hypothesis: 
H9: The greater the cultural sensitivity in an international strategic alliance,  
       the higher the trust in the alliance. 
 
Commitment and Alliance Coordination Effectiveness 
Commitment. “An implicit and explicit pledge of relational continuity between 
exchange partners” is defined as commitment (Dywer et al. 1987, p.19).  Commitment is 
one of the key variables related to successful relationship marketing (Moorman et al. 
1992; Morgan and Hunt 1994; Siguaw et al. 2003).  Commitment implies an enduring 
desire of interorganizational partners to achieve shared goals through joint efforts 
(Wilson 1995).  Commitment is based on the partners’ beliefs that an on-going exchange 
relationship with one another is worth working on, so the partners try to maximize their 
efforts to ensure that the relationship endures indefinitely (Morgan and Hunt 1994, p.23).  
Committed partners rectify problems, reduce conflict, and forego self-interest to enhance 
a valuable long-term partnership (Anderson and Weitz 1992; Griffith, Hu, and Ryans, Jr. 
2000; Moorman et al. 1992).  Commitment assumes that alliance partners will invest 
credible inputs to produce mutually desirable outcomes (Gundlach, Achrol, and Mentzer 
1995) and that the partners will make short-term sacrifices to obtain a long-term and 
stable relationship (Anderson and Weitz 1992).  Commitment also presumes that ISA 
partners can discern the benefits of the exchange relationship and that they expect 
consistent and continued investments from the partners to maintain the successful 
relationship (Dwyer et al. 1987). 
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Commitment fosters an environment in which cooperation and social bonding 
between ISA partners are enhanced, which brings more interactions and concerted 
actions that help to align the partners’ expectations and goals (Rodríguez 2002).  
Commitment also helps the partners in an exchange relationship more easily reach a 
consensus in the decision-making processes because of reduced uncertainty about the 
decision process itself (Menon et al. 1999).  A high level of commitment between 
alliance partners indicates that the partners value the alliance and are also willing to 
make considerable efforts toward desirable accommodations in which dedication to a 
partnership is heightened (Dyer and Singh 1998; Luo 2002). 
Based on the above arguments, it is likely that commitment contributed by 
alliance partners nurtures an environment so that alliance partners are willing to invest 
requisite resources in an alliance to maximize the combined effects of the resources.  
When a committed atmosphere exists between alliance partners, the continuity 
expectation of the relationship between the partners is increased so that each partner 
willingly invests more resources and efforts into the alliance and tries to maximize the 
use of resources available for them.  The above arguments made about commitment 
suggest the following hypothesis:  
H10a: The higher the commitment in an international strategic alliance, the  
greater the integration of activities related to pooling of resources in the 
alliance.  
 
H10b: The higher the commitment in an international strategic alliance, the  
greater the utilization of the pooled resources in the alliance. 
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Trust and Commitment 
A trusting interorganizational relationship results in fewer safeguards needed to 
monitor partners, increases their mutual attachment, and reduces opportunistic behavior 
of the partners (Andaleeb 1996).  Increased mutual attachment and reduced opportunistic 
behavior encourage alliance partners to put forth a grater level of effort and investment 
to achieve a better exchange relationship (Lambe et al. 2000).  Trust in the partners is 
expected to increase the likelihood that the partners will become committed to the 
relationship.  For example, Moorman et al.(1992) demonstrates that marketing research 
user’s trust in research knowledge providers positively increases the user’s commitment 
to the user-provider relationship.  Credibility, faith, and belief in exchange partners 
enhance the value of the buyer-seller relationship and the expectation of continuation of 
the relationship even when new conditions arise.  The trust-based exchange relationship, 
in turn, leads the partners to commit themselves to such a relationship (Ganesan 1994).  
Since interorganizational partners reach the commitment stage through 
significant emotional and economic resource investments, which induces a strong bond 
among the partners, they need time to truly commit and have confidence in the 
successful partnership development (Dwyer et al. 1987; Geyskens, Steenkamp, and 
Kumar 1999).  The benefits of trust, such as belief in the continuation of the relationship 
and faith in the partner’s actions, strengthen the desire for commitment to the 
relationship.  Trust is a major determinant of commitment in relationship marketing 
(Achrol 1991).  Geyskens et al.’s (1999) meta-analysis about marketing channel 
relationships demonstrates that trust fosters commitment.  Andaleeb’s(1996) retailing 
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marketing channel study shows that the buyer commits more to the supplier when the 
buyer has a higher level of trust in the supplier.  Siguaw et al.’s (2003) relational 
exchange study shows that distributor trust in the supplier positively impacts distributor 
commitment to the channel relationship.  Since commitment entails vulnerability, ISA 
firms will seek only trustworthy partners to whom they can commit (Sarkar et al. 1997).  
Commitment is, therefore, an outcome of trust in relationship marketing.  
H11: The higher the trust in an international strategic alliance, the higher  
the commitment to the alliance. 
 
Summary 
 
This chapter addressed the proposed model of alliance coordination effectiveness 
(ACE), trust, exogenous factors (reciprocity, transparency, communication frequency 
and efficacy), commitment, ISA performance, and control variables (host government 
interference and technology turbulence).  First, the effects of ACE on ISA performance 
are hypothesized.  Second, the control variables are hypothesized to influence the 
relationship between ACE and ISA performance. Next, the exogenous factors are 
hypothesized to influence trust.  Trust and commitment are hypothesized to impact ACE.  
Finally, trust is assumed to influence commitment.  The next chapter will present the 
research design and the methodology to test the hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter addresses the research methodology used to test the proposed 
model.  The first section presents the research setting (i.e., the sample and the 
respondents).  The second section discusses the questionnaire development process, the 
pre-testing procedure, and the survey (mail and web) procedure.  The final section 
outlines the statistical analysis procedures adopted to test the proposed hypotheses. 
Research Setting, Sample Frame, and Respondents 
Research Setting 
 
Both a mail and a web survey were employed to collect data and test the 
hypotheses proposed.  The mail survey was used thanks to cooperation from the Center 
for International Business Studies at Texas A&M University.  It was sent to members of 
the International Program Council at Texas A& M University.  The web survey method 
was adopted because the development of computer technology allows researchers to 
collect data efficiently compared to the traditional mail survey (Dillman 2000).  The web 
survey allows researchers to collect necessary data in a shorter period of time and to 
require less cost than does a mail survey (Dillman 2000).  In designing the survey, 
several steps were taken to minimize potential systematic errors that could occur and to 
increase response rate. 
Sample Frame 
The survey population for this study was individuals who were/are involved in 
international businesses and alliance operations in the U.S. and other countries.  The 
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mail addresses of the International Program Council at Texas A&M University were 
obtained from the Center for International Business Studies at Mays Business School, 
Texas A&M University.  The email addresses of the target sample were acquired via an 
alliance organization, the Greater Houston Partnership (the Houston Chamber of 
Commerce), and the Greater Dallas Chamber (the Dallas Chamber of Commerce).   
The target sample is considered appropriate because it consists of individuals 
who are/were involved in international business operations to achieve competitive 
advantages in global markets and thus are likely to have strategic alliance experience 
with foreign partners (Dyer et al. 2001).  SIC-type codes are not used for the sample 
because of the international nature of the data inconsistencies and the unavailability of 
different classification systems in various countries (Dussauge et al. 2000).  ISAs are 
categorized as equity (i.e., joint venture) and non-equity alliances (e.g., marketing 
agreement, R&D agreement, supply agreement, licensing, consortium, etc.) to find out 
whether there are any systematic differences in their partnership development and the 
achievement of performance between equity and non-equity ISAs.  An ISA consists of a 
partner firm(s) from the U.S. and a firm(s) from other countries. The location of the 
alliance can either be the U.S. or outside the U.S. 
Respondents 
Several steps were taken to reduce the respondent’s bias on the survey 
questionnaire. The respondent for this survey is a person who knows or experiences the 
operation of an ISA (Huber and Power 1985; Lambe et al. 2002).  In order to answer 
survey questions regarding the development of alliance partnerships and performance 
    
61
implications, specific knowledge and responsibilities on ISA operation are required 
(Huber and Power 1985; Kale, Singh, and Perlmutter 2000).  The typical respondent, 
therefore, is likely to be a CEO/president, a general or regional manager who is in charge 
of international operation of his/her firm, or an ISA manager who is/was actually 
involved in the ISA operation.  To further ensure ‘a knowledgeable person’ answered the 
survey, there is one survey item that asks the respondent how long he/she has been 
involved in the operation of the alliance.  The respondent should have a considerable 
time to observe and evaluate how the partner relationship evolves and what outcomes an 
international strategic alliance produces.  The respondent also should choose the most 
recent ISA to avoid selecting only one of the most successful ISAs within his/her 
company.  The respondent bias on the survey can be minimized in these ways.   
Since a significant correlation between the partner firm manager and ISA 
manager on ISA performance evaluation has been found (Geringer and Herbert 1991; 
Yan and Gray 1994), it is expected that there will no significant differences between the 
partner manager and ISA manager in their responses on the survey.  However, this 
survey will have a potential limitation because it will only reflect the perspectives from 
U.S. firm managers.  The responses from foreign partner firms and the comparison with 
the survey answers from U.S. firms will ideally provide a more accurate evaluation of 
the ISA, but time, cost, and difficulty in finding the foreign partner limited the adoption 
of such a method.   
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Questionnaire Development 
This section describes how the survey instrument (mail and web) was developed.  
An overview of the questionnaire development process and the pretesting procedure are 
presented followed by the operationalization and measurement issues associated with the 
constructs. 
This research required nine broad categories of constructs to be measured: 
reciprocity, transparency, communication frequency (formal and informal), 
communication efficacy (two-way and participative), cultural sensitivity, trust, 
commitment, alliance coordination effectiveness (ACE; integration and utilization), 
market environment turbulence (host government interference and technology 
turbulence), and ISA performance. The constructs were defined clearly so as not to cause 
any ambiguities.  Whenever possible, existing scales or measures were employed.  A 
large pool of items relevant to the constructs was generated from extant literature to 
capture the multi-item constructs.  When the items were not sufficient to measure a 
construct, new items were developed and refined and the new items were added to the 
existing items to capture the domain of the construct.  Care was given to tap the 
appropriate domain of the construct as closely as possible.  Next, the number of items for 
each construct was reduced to a manageable set of items.  A pretest was conducted on 
the reduced sets of items. 
    
63
Measures1 
Reciprocity.  Since existing scales do not quite capture the essence of the 
transparency concept as defined for this research, four items were adopted and modified 
from extant literature.  The emphasis of the reciprocity items was given as fair 
exchanges between alliance partners (Mohr and Spekman 1994), the willingness of the 
partner to return favors to its partner after it gets favors from its partner (Ruyter and 
Wetzels 2000), and a give-and-take relationship between ISA partners.  A seven-point 
Likert scale was used to measure reciprocity anchored on (1) strongly disagree and (7) 
strongly agree.  
Transparency.  Though the concept of transparency has been mentioned as an 
important factor in alliances (Hamel 1991), no specific items, which could measure 
transparency for this study, have been developed.  Thus, a total of four items were 
developed and adapted.  Two items were adapted from Heide and John (1992) in which 
the items match the concept of transparency defined for this research.  The two items 
emphasize the importance of informing each other about any developments and mutual 
expectations that any necessary information is not withheld between alliance partners.  
The other two items were developed from the relationship marketing and alliance 
literature to capture the definition of transparency.  The focus of the two items is to 
measure whether the partner firm clearly understands the information provided by its 
partner(s) or intentions or behavior of its partner firm(s).  A seven-point Likert scale 
anchored on (1) strongly disagree and (7) strongly agree was used to measure 
                                                          
1 All measures can be found in Appendix A. 
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relationship transparency.  Respondents were asked to respond to what extent the items 
characterize the relationship with their partner(s). 
Communication.  Two dimensions of communication (frequency and efficacy) 
are used to capture how communication affects a trusting relationship between ISA 
partners.  
Frequency dimensions of communication have two aspects: formal and informal 
communication.  The focus of frequency communication items was defined as how often 
communication occurs formally and informally between alliance partners.  A total of six 
items was adapted from Sarkar et al. (1997) and Young-Ybarra and Wiersema (1999) 
and modified to fit the definition of formal/informal communication as defined for this 
research.  Formal and information communication each has three items.    
There are two subdimensions in efficacy communication, two-way (bi-
directional) and participative communication.  The three items for two-way 
communication were drawn and modified from Dyer and Song (1997) and Fisher et al. 
(1997).  The two-way items measure whether alliance partners provide feedback about 
each partner’s decisions and strategies, timely and effective responses to each other’s 
communications, and encourage each other to express opinions.  Three items for 
participative communication were drawn and modified from Mohr and Spekman (1994) 
and Anderson and Weitz (1992).  The items for participative communication measure 
the extent to which each partner was involved in planning and goal setting and providing 
advice and counsel regarding alliance market strategies.  A seven-point Likert scale 
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anchored on (1) strongly disagree and (7) strongly agree was used to measure the 
frequency and efficacy dimensions of communication. 
Cultural Sensitivity.  One item for cultural sensitivity was adapted from Johnson 
et al. (1996) and modified to fit this research.  The other three items were developed to 
capture the domain of cultural sensitivity defined in this research.  The items emphasize 
the extent to which each partner is sensitive to each other’s culture and ways of doing 
business, tries to adapt to different ways of doing business with each partner, and 
appreciates different cultures existing between alliance partners.  A seven-point Likert 
scale anchored on (1) strongly disagree and (7) strongly agree measures the domain of 
cultural sensitivity. 
Trust.  Since many researches have already developed items for trust, a large 
pool of trust items was collected.  Based on this pool, four items, which are appropriate 
in an ISA context, were selected and modified for the purpose of this research.  Two 
items were drawn and modified from Doney and Cannon (1997), and the remaining two 
items were adapted from Johnson et al. (1996).  The selected items emphasize keeping 
promises, non-opportunistic behaviors, and trustworthiness of the partner firm. The 
items are anchored on a seven-point Likert scale from (1) strongly disagree to (7) 
strongly agree.   
Commitment.  Based on a large of pool of commitment items, four items were 
taken and modified for the purpose of this research, anchored as (1) strongly disagree 
and (7) strongly agree.  Two items were adapted from Morgan and Hunt (1994), one 
item from Sarkar et al. (1997), and the remaining item was taken from Cullen, Johnson, 
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and Sakano (1995).  The items focus on strong effort of the partner firm to maintain the 
alliance relationship and loyalty to each other.  The items were measured on a seven- 
point Likert scale anchored on (1) strongly disagree and (7) strongly agree. 
Alliance Coordination Effectiveness (Integration and Utilization).  The definition 
of ACE includes integration and utilization of each partner’s resources.  
Since existing items for integration do not clearly capture the integration 
construct as defined in this research, relevant literature such as cross-functional 
literature, buyer-seller literature and alliance literature, which emphasize cooperation 
between inter organizational partners, were reviewed to develop relevant items for 
integration.  The review process generated five integration items.  The five items focus 
on share, exchange, cooperative transfer of resources, and facilitation of resources 
between alliance partners to create a pool of resources that alliance partners can employ 
in order to achieve alliance objectives.  A seven-point Likert scale is adopted anchored 
on (1) strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree. 
Like the generation of the integration items, interorganizational relationship 
literature such as the buyer-seller relationship, alliance relationship, or cross-functional 
literature was reviewed to develop and capture the domain of utilization defined for this 
research.  The review process generated five items.  The five items focus on coordinated 
activities between alliance partners, which include effective allocation of alliance 
resources, joint implementation of alliance market strategies, and coordinated decision-
making between the partners to effectively use the alliance resources.  The items used a 
seven-point Likert scale anchored on (1) strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree. 
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Market Environment Turbulence.  Market environment turbulence consists of 
host government interference and technology turbulence.  Because items to measure host 
government interference do not exist, four items to capture the domain of host 
`government interference were created.  The four items developed measure the extent of 
host government intervention in the operation of the ISA, frequent policy changes, and 
favors for the local partner.  The items were anchored on (1) strongly disagree to (7) 
strongly agree to measure the domain of host government interference.   
Four items for technology turbulence were taken from Jaworski and Kohli (1993) 
and modified appropriately for this research.  The four items focus on the technological 
developments and changes in the market which can impact the operations of ISAs.  All 
the items for market turbulence were anchored on (1) strongly disagree and (7) strongly 
agree. 
ISA Performance.  ISA performance is measured by the extent to which each 
respondent believed its firm achieved its financial and non-financial objectives in the 
alliance.  The respondent could choose financial and non-financial objectives that his/her 
firm would like to achieve in the ISA and then he/she would express his/her opinion 
regarding the extent to which the objectives were achieved.  Three items for financial 
and non-financial objectives, respectively, measure the extent to which the respondents 
think his/her firm achieved their objectives.  Financial performance measures were sales 
growth, market share, lower production cost, and profitability.  Non-financial 
performance measures consisted of such objectives as acquisition of partner technology, 
use of partner distribution channels, acquisition and use of partner marketing skills, 
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acquisition and use of partner’s knowledge of foreign markets, improvement of product 
design, improvement of product quality manufacturing process, providing better service 
for customers, overcoming foreign government barriers, and entering a foreign market.  
These alliance performance measures have been adopted by many alliance researchers 
(Lambe et al. 2002; Mjoen and Tallman 1997; Yan and Gray 1994).  A seven-point 
Likert scale anchored on (1) strongly disagree and (7) strongly agree measured ISA 
performance. 
Pretesting 
Pretesting provides a means of reducing ambiguity and bias in the meaning of 
measures (Churchill 1979).  To ensure that the items for each construct truly reflected 
the construct of interest, the survey was pretested with 50 individuals in companies who 
are or were involved in international business operations or international strategic 
alliances through a mail survey.  Since it may be difficult for respondents to provide any 
specific comments on the items or instructions (e.g., clarity) in the web survey, a mail 
survey rather than a web survey was used. 
The questionnaire, after been revised several times by the author with inputs 
from various marketing faculty, was developed to be as close to the final questionnaire 
as possible for the web survey.  The participants represent a convenience sample but 
were expected to provide valid information about the survey because the respondents 
were individuals who are/were involved in the international business operations of their 
companies.  There were a total of four responses.  Based on the feedback from the 
respondents, changes were made to further refine the questionnaire.  Some respondents 
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pointed out the lack of clarity in some items and some items that should be included as a 
result.  Several items were refined and some items were added and dropped from the 
final survey instrument.   
Survey Procedures 
Based on the pretesting results, the final questionnaire was prepared for Texas 
A&M University International Program Council and for individuals obtained from the 
Greater Partnership Houston (the Houston Chamber of Commerce), the Dallas Chamber 
of Commerce, and one alliance association.  A mail survey was developed for the Texas 
A&M University International Program Council members and a web survey was 
developed for the other individuals.  The content of the mail and web surveys (i e., the 
questionnaire items) were the same.  The cover letter used included the title of the study, 
the logo of Texas A&M business school, a brief description of the study, and a 
description of incentives (i.e., sharing a summary of the findings and a $2 donation to 
either the American Cancer Society or UNICEF: United Nations Children’s Fund).  
However, there was an additional cover letter from the Director of the Center for 
International Business Studies for the International Program Council members, which 
was used to increase the response rate from members.  The Council members were not 
provided the $ 2 donation incentive.  
Both the mail and the web survey collected data through a self-administered, 
cross-sectional questionnaire from individuals involved in an ISA operation.  For the 
mail survey, the first mailing was sent to fifty International Program Council members at 
Texas A&M University.  Three weeks after the first mailing, a reminder letter, along 
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with a copy of a cover letter from the Director of the Center for International Business 
Studies at Texas A&M University and a copy of the questionnaire, was sent to those 
who had not yet responded at that time.  In the case of the web survey, three additional 
steps were taken to ensure that 1) each individual could open the web questionnaire, 2) 
the same respondent would not respond to the survey multiple times, and 3) the data 
input was automatically transferred to an Excel spread sheet of the author.  
To ensure that each individual could open the survey, two links to the web survey 
questionnaire, “Survey Begins Here” and the web address of the survey, were added at 
the end of the cover letter.  By clicking either “Survey Begins Here” or the web address 
for the questionnaire, the respondent could be linked to the actual web survey.  The web 
address for the survey was added because some hyperlinks do not open in different 
computer servers.  Since multiple responses by the same person can distort the integrity 
of data, Internet Protocol (IP) addresses of respondents were checked and, if the same 
address was found, the extra response was deleted (Cobanoglu,Warde,and Moreo 2001).  
The questionnaire was designed to automatically transfer each data input from the 
respondent to the Excel spread sheet, which makes it easier to collect and analyze the 
data. 
 Two wave mailings were sent to the fifty Texas A&M International Program 
Council members.  The final questionnaire, a cover letter from the Director of the Center 
for International Business Studies, a cover letter from the author, and an incentive (i.e., 
sharing of the study’s findings) were included in each mailing.  After receiving 
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responses from the first mailing, the second mailing was sent to those who had not 
responded at that time.  
In the case of the web survey, a four-wave mailing was adopted, modified from 
the “total design method”(Dillman 1978) and the Internet survey method (Dillman 
2000).  The first mailing with a pre-notice was sent to individuals identified as being 
involved in international business and a member of an alliance organization.  The cover 
letter included the title of the study, confidentiality statement, the logo of Texas A&M’s 
business school, a brief description of the study’s purpose, and incentives (i.e., sharing 
of the summary of the findings and a $2 donation to either the American Cancer Society 
or United Nations Children’s Fund) to elicit participation.  Two days later, a cover letter 
with the two links to the survey was sent to individuals (the second mailing) because 
respondents tend to have a vivid memory about the pre-notice if the second mailing is 
sent within two or three days(Dillman 2000).  The third and fourth mailing (a week after 
each mailing) was sent only to those individuals who had not yet responded.  The third 
and fourth mailing excluded those individuals who expressed that they were not 
interested in completing the survey or that their firm did not have any ISA operation. 
In order to assess whether there was any non-response bias, two non-response 
bias methods were adopted.  The first is the comparison between the early and late 
responses recommended by Armstrong and Overton (1977).  The respondents were 
divided into early and late respondents depending on the dates the response are received.  
T-tests for main constructs were performed between early and late respondents to 
determine if there was any non-response bias.  The second compared the respondents 
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from the original survey and a short version of the survey.  T-tests between the versions 
of the survey were conducted to determine if there was any non-response bias. 
Data Analysis Procedures: Hypothesis Testing 
This section describes the data analysis procedures that were used to test 
the hypotheses proposed in the study.  To find the most appropriate measures of items 
for each construct, exploratory factor analysis was first used and then confirmatory 
factor analysis was employed.  After confirmatory factor analysis, most of the 
hypotheses except the moderating effects of host government interference and market 
turbulence were tested using structural equation modeling (SEM).  Structural equation 
modeling using LIREL 8 (Jöreskog and Sorböm 1996) was adopted because SEM 
combines both multiple regression and factor analysis, which allows the researcher to 
estimate a series of separate, but interdependent, multiple regressions simultaneously 
while providing statistical efficiency (Hair, Anderon, Tatham, and Black 1998).  SEM, 
therefore, would be an ideal technique to test main hypotheses given the complex 
relationships between the constructs.  
Model Fit 
Satisfactory model fits were measured by chi-square tests, the root mean square 
error of approximation (RMSEA), the non-normed fit index (NNFI), the comparative fit 
index (CFI), and the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR).  The chi-square 
tests should be non-significant because the non-significant tests indicate that differences 
of the observed (sample) and estimated covariance matrices are non-significant.  
However, reliance on the chi-square test as the sole measure of a model fit is not 
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recommended because the test is sensitive to sample size such that small deviations from 
a true model can reject the hypothesized model in large samples and large deviations of a 
hypothesized model from a true model may not be detected (Bagozzi and Edwards 
1998).  Other indices such as the RMSEA, the NNFI, the CFI, and the SRMR were also 
used to measure model fit. 
The RMSEA is an estimate of the discrepancy between the observed and 
estimated covariance matrices in the population (Hair et al. 1998).  The SRMR is a 
standardized summary of the average covariance residuals, which are the differences 
between the observed and estimated covariances (Kline 1998).  The NFI (normed fit 
index) indicates the increment in fit of the proposed model relative to the null model 
(i.e., one in which observed variables are uncorrelated). The NNFI considers a 
correlation for model complexity (Kline 1998).  The CFI is interpreted in the same way 
as the NNFI and represents the relative improvement in fit of the hypothesized model 
over the null model.  The CFI provides an unbiased estimate of its corresponding 
population value and is less sensitive to sample size.  The CFI is an indication of how 
much variation in measures is accounted for from a practical standpoint.  For example, 
values less than .9 implies that significant amounts of variance remain to be unexplained 
and values more .9 suggests that further relaxation of parameter constraints is not 
warranted and might lead to overfitting (Bagozzi and Edwards 1998, p. 62).  Though 
there are no absolute criteria which indicate good indices, non-significant chi-squares,  
SRMR and RMSEA values less than .08, and NNFI and CFI values greater than .9 are 
generally considered good fit indices (Bergami and Bagozzi 2000).   
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Interaction Effects of Market Environment Turbulence 
The moderating effects of host government interference and technology 
turbulence were investigated by moderated regression analysis because the number of 
sample size (N=162) is not large enough to use multigroup analysis given the complex 
model of the research (Hair et al. 1998).  The interaction effects of predictor variables on 
ISA performance were investigated by mean-centering predictors.   
Summary 
This chapter describes the development of the mail and web surveys, measures 
for the surveys, and data analysis procedures.  The sample frame was International 
Program Council members for the mail survey and individuals who are/were involved in 
the operations of ISAs for the web survey.  The mail and the web survey followed and 
modified Dillman’s(1978) total design method and Dillman’s(2000) Internet survey 
method.  It was indicated that the hypotheses would be tested using SEM and multiple 
regression analysis.  The next chapter will address the results from the data collection 
and analysis procedures and the measurement model assessment before presenting the 
results by the structural model testing. 
    
75
CHAPTER V 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND MEASUREMENT MODEL ASSESSEMENT 
This chapter describes the results from the data collection and analysis 
procedures.  First, the response rate, the non-response bias, and the characteristics of the 
sample are presented.  Second, the measurement model is evaluated in which 
exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis results are discussed.   
Response Rate and Non-response Bias 
There were four different groups which were used to collect data for the analysis.  
The first group was a mail survey group.  The remaining three groups were from a web 
survey.   The individuals of the first two web survey groups were those who are/were 
involved in international business operations in their firms.  The third group of 
individuals in the web survey was from an alliance organization.  The email addresses in 
the three web survey groups were obtained from the Chamber of Commerce in Houston 
and Dallas, and the email addresses of the association members were available to the 
author because the author is a member of the association.  
Overall, a total of 178 surveys were returned for a response rate of 4.4% 
(178/4064).  Group 1, comprised of the fifty International Program Council members at 
Texas A&M University, returned twenty five replies.  Group 2 consisted of 1,900 
individuals and a total of fifty six replies from this group were received.  A total of forty 
one responses was received from Group 3 with 1,107 individuals, and a total of fifty six 
responses was received from Group 4 with 1,007 organizational members.  All of the 
mail and email responses were reviewed to assess their appropriateness.  Six respondents 
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from the mail survey explained that they did not have ISA experience or their experience 
was too old.  Their responses were excluded from the analysis.  Ten of the email 
responses were not usable because of missing data and were excluded from the 
subsequent data analysis.  Many email surveys did not reach respondents because of 
incorrect email addresses, non-use of the current email address, or technical problems.  
Some expressed that they were not interested in answering the questionnaire or their 
experience was not appropriate for answering the survey (see Table 2 for specific 
numbers and reasons which were not included in actual responses).  Some responses did 
not contain data such as sales volume or percentage of international sales volume.  
However, since these data were not critical for testing the hypotheses proposed in this 
study, they were included in the analysis.  After removing the sixteen responses and 
other non-responses (i.e., non-delivery, non-appropriate, no-interest, or removal request), 
the overall final response rate for the overall surveys (the mail and the web survey 
combined) was 4.8% (162/3354). The mail survey response rate was 43.2% (19/44) and 
the overall web survey response was 4.3 % (143/3310).  
ANOVA tests were used to determine if there were any group differences in 
terms of their responses.  The means of the focal constructs in the four groups were 
compared and it was found that there were no significant differences in their responses 
(see Table 3 for specific tests for mean differences between the groups). 
Since the response rate was low, it is important to test for non-response bias.  If 
non-respondents are significantly different from respondents, the generalization of the  
 
 
    
77
Table 2 
Sample Response Rates 
 Group1 (mail) Group 2 (web) (Dallas) 
Group3 (web) 
(Houston) 
Group4 (web) 
(Alliance Org.) 
# of sample 50 1,900 1,107 1,007 
# of responses 25 56 41 56 
# of error(non-
deliverable) 0 172 88 193 
# of not 
appropriate(no-
ISA, too old 
experience, 
corporate policy)  
6 87 30 30 
# of no-interest 
or remove 0 45 24 25 
# of non-usable 
Responses 0 5 3 2 
# of usable 
responses 19 51 38 54 
Final usable 
response rate (%) 43.2% 3.2% 3.95% 
14.1% 
 
 
 
findings from the respondent sample to the general population may be limited.  Non- 
response bias, the extent to which respondents are different from non-respondents, was 
measured using 1) a comparison of the responses from early respondents with those from 
late respondents (Armstrong and Overton 1977) and 2) a comparison of the responses 
based on the original questionnaire with the responses based on a condensed version of 
the questionnaire (Jones III 1997).  
For the comparison of early and late respondents, the sample was divided into 
early (approximately 75% of the sample, N=121) and late respondents (approximately 
25% of the sample, N=41) depending on the time when their responses were received.  
Using t-tests, the comparisons of the early and late respondents showed that non-
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response bias was not a concern.  The mean differences for the focal factors between 
early and late respondents were insignificant (see Table 4). 
 
Table 3 
Group Mean Differences 
Factor F Significance* 
Reciprocity .312 .817 
Transparency .350 .789 
Communication Frequency 1.208 .309 
Communication Efficacy .960 .413 
Cultural Sensitivity .365 .778 
Trust .253 .859 
Commitment .393 .758 
Integration .355 .786 
Utilization .611 .609 
Financial Performance 1.548 .204 
Non-financial Performance 1.288 .280 
*p<.05  
  
 
Another way of measuring non-response bias was to compare the means of the 
original responses (N=162) and those of the responses based on a condensed version of 
the questionnaire with selected items for the focal constructs.  A condensed version of 
the questionnaire with the selected items was sent to those who did not respond to the 
original survey.  A total of forty people responded to the condensed version of the 
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questionnaire.  T-test results comparing the forty respondents to the original respondents 
(N=162) indicated that there were no differences in their mean differences, which 
verifies again that non-response bias was not a concern (see Table 5). 
 
Table 4 
Non-response Bias Between Early and Late Respondents 
Factor t df Sig.(2-tailed)1 Mean Difference 
Reciprocity .228 160 .820 -.050 
Transparency -.554 160 .580 -.129 
Communication Frequency .607 160 .545 .125 
Communication Efficacy -.137 160 .891 -.033 
Cultural Sensitivity -.587 160 .558 -.146 
Trust -.508 160 .612 -.132 
Commitment -.121 160 .904 -.031 
Integration .062 160 .951 -.015 
Utilization .731 160 .466 .176 
Financial Performance -.338 160 .736 -.092 
Non-financial Performance .400 160 .690 .103 
1p<.05 
Note:  Early respondents in the web survey were those who responded up to the third 
mailing of the web survey.  Late respondents were the remaining 25% of the respondents 
who responded to the last (fourth) mailing.  Early respondents in the mail survey were 
considered to be the first 75% of the respondents.  Late respondents in the mail survey 
were the remaining 25% of the respondents. 
 
Sample Characteristics 
Respondents were asked to provide information about the type of ISA they 
are/were involved in (either equity or non-equity ISA), their current position, company  
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Table 5 
Mean Differences Between the Original Survey Respondents and the Condensed 
Version Survey Respondents 
Factor N df t Significance (2-tailed)* 
REC., TRSP., CF., CE 162 200 40 1.224 .223 
CS., TR., CM., IT., UT 162 200 40 .118 .907 
Note: REC=reciprocity, TRSP=transparency, CF=communication frequency,   
  CE=communication efficacy, CS=cultural sensitivity, TR=trust, CM=commitment 
IT= integration, UT=utilization 
*p<.05 
 
 
sales, percentage of sales from abroad, years of the ISA operation, and years of 
involvement in the ISA operation.  Though a total of 162 usable responses were 
received, some of the respondents did not provide information about some of these 
questions (see Table 6).  
One hundred twenty four (approximately 76.5%) respondents indicated their firm 
is/was involved in a non-equity ISA.  Of those that provided the information about their 
position (N=136), one hundred respondents (approximately 73.5%) reported that their 
position was president, CEO, vice president, or director.  Twenty six respondents 
(approximately 19.1%) were alliance managers and the rest, ten (approximately 7.4%) 
were sourcing managers, R&D managers, etc.   
Though confidentiality was promised, many respondents were reluctant to 
disclose their company’s sales volume.  Only fifty five respondents reported this figure.  
The average sales volume was $847 million.  One hundred fifty one respondents average 
provided the operation period (years) of the ISA they chose for the questionnaire.  The 
years of the ISA operation was 3.72 years.  Fifty of the 151 ISAs (approximately
 81
Table 6 
Sample Characteristics 
Type of ISA 
 
 
Position 
(N=136) 
Total Sales 
($) 
(N=55) 
Percentage of 
Sales from 
Abroad 
(N=101) 
Years of 
ISA 
Operation 
(N=151) 
Years of Involvement
in the ISA 
(N=148) 
Equity (38)1 
 
Upper Management (75) 
(eg., CEO, president) 
 
Over 10 
billion  (16) 
Over 50% 
(51) 
Over 5 years 
(50) 
Over 5 years 
(18) 
Non-equity 
(124)2 
Director                   (25) 
(e.g., alliance director)  
4-5 years 
(27) 
4-5 years 
(24) 
 
 
Middle Manager      (26) 
(e.g., alliance manager) 
100 million 
--10 billion 
(23) 
Less than 50% 
(50) 
1-3 years 
(74) 
.6-3 years 
(106) 
    
 
Other                       (10) 
(e.g., R&D manager)    
  
Less than 
100 million 
(16)    
Average  847 million 47.20% 3.72 years 2.68 years 
Note:  Total sample size is 162.  
1   The number in parentheses indicates the number of respondents. 
2  Type of the non-equity ISA and the number: Licensing (21), Joint Marketing (41), R&D (11), Supply Agreement (25),  
 Consortium(9), and others (17). 
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one third) have been operating for more than five years, and the other two-thirds have 
been operating less than five years.  The average years of involvement of the 
respondents in the operation of the ISA (N=148) was approximately 2.7 years.  Thirty 
one respondents (approximately 20.9%) are/were involved more than five years.  The 
majority of respondents (N=117, approximately 79.1%) are/were involved for less than 5 
years. 
Given the years of involvement of the respondents in the ISA operation and their 
position in their firms, it can be concluded that these respondents are in a position to be 
able to respond to the survey questionnaire so that they could evaluate the partnership 
development and the performance of their firm in the ISA.    
Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) and Reliability 
Before testing the hypotheses using structural equation modeling (SEM), the 
measurement model was evaluated to examine whether the factors (latent variables) 
were reliable and valid (i.e., reliabilities and validities of each factor were assessed).  
EFA was used on the items for each scale.  EFA was employed to reduce the number of 
items that could be subjected to confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) or to determine any 
underlying dimension of factors.  Maximum Likelihood Estimation with promax rotation 
was done with SPSS to capture whether each factor (latent variable) had appropriate 
loadings.  Eigen values greater than one were used to determine the number of factors 
extracted.  All factors (latent variables) were divided into three groups to perform EFA 
and subsequently CFA because of the large number of items.  The three groups are 
exogenous factors (i.e., reciprocity, transparency, two-way communication, formal and 
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informal communication, participative communication, and cultural sensitivity), 
endogenous factors (i.e., trust, commitment, integration, utilization, and financial and 
non-financial performance), and control variables (i.e., host government interference and 
technology turbulence).  
Table 7 shows the EFA results for exogenous factors.  A five-factor solution with 
appropriate loadings was obtained for the seven antecedents of trust.  Reciprocity, 
transparency, and two-way communication load highly on the same factor.  Formal and 
informal communication load on a different factor though they are under the same 
factor, “communication frequency”, in the model. 
The reliabilities (i.e., the extent to which a scale produces internally consistent 
measures for multi-item scales) were measured via Cronbach’s coefficient alpha, which 
is commonly used in social science studies (Kerlinger and Lee 2000).  The reliabilities 
and number of items for each exogenous factor are reported in Table 8.  All reliabilities 
are greater than .70, which is a common threshold criterion to measure internal 
consistency of items (Kerlinger and Lee 2000). 
The second group consists of the endogenous factors: trust, commitment, alliance 
coordination effectiveness (integration and utilization), and the two performance 
dimensions (financial and non-financial).  Table 9 shows a four-factor solution with 
appropriate loadings.  Trust and commitment load highly on the same factor.  Likewise, 
financial and non-financial performance measures loaded on the same factor.  The 
reliabilities and number of items for each endogenous factor are shown in Table 10.  All 
reliabilities exceed .70. 
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Table 7 
Exploratory Factor Analysis for Exogenous Factors (the Antecedents of Trust)1 
    Factor   
  1 2 3 4 5 
Reciprocity1 .472     
Reciprocity2 .855     
Reciprocity3 .515     
Reciprocity4 .790     
Transparency1 .827     
Transparency2 .599     
Transparency3 .627  .397   
Transparency4 .454     
Two-way Communcation1 .364     
Two-way Communcation2 .545     
Two-way Communciation3 .409     
Formal Communciation1   .683   
Formal Communciation2   .872   
Formal Communication3   .461   
Informal Communciation1    .575  
Informal Communciation2    .625  
Informal Communication3    1.143  
Participative Communication1     .892 
Participative Communication2     .832 
Participative Communciation3     .554 
Cultural Sensivity1   .789    
Cultural Sensivity2  .836    
Cultural Sensivity3  .844    
Cultural Sensivity4  .684    
1 Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.   
  Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.   
Note: Factor loadings less than .25 are not shown for interpretability. 
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Table 8 
Reliability for Exogenous Factors 
Factor        Coefficient Alpha   Number of Items 
Reciprocity      .75       4 
Transparency      .86       4 
Formal Communication   .73       3 
Informal Communication   .83       3  
Two-way Communication  .84       3 
Participative Communication  .84       3 
Cultural Sensitivity    .91       4 
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Table 9 
Exploratory Factor Analysis for Endogenous Factors1 
           Factor   
 1 2 3 4 
  Trust1 .522    
  Trust2 .823    
  Trust3 .985    
  Trust4 1.036    
  Commitment1 .801    
  Commitment2 .564 .424   
  Commitment3 .663    
  Commitment4 .694    
  Utilization1   .839  
  Utilization2   .747  
  Utilization3   .952  
  Utilization4   .751  
  Utilization5   .712  
  Integration1    .886 
  Integration2    .931 
  Financial Performance1  .700   
  Financial Performance2  .602   
  Financial Performance3  .521   
  Non-financial Performance1  .983   
  Non-financial Performance2  .977   
  Non-financial Performance3  .887   
      1 Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.   
        Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization. 
      Note: Factor loadings less than .25 are not shown for interpretability.  
 
 
The last group is control variables, that is, host government interference and 
technology turbulence.  These two variables are components of market  
environment turbulence.  Table 11 reports the results for the control variables by using 
EFA.  Table 12 shows the reliabilities and number of items for each variable.  The 
reliabilities are over .70. 
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Table 10 
Reliability for Endogenous Factors 
Factor        Coefficient Alpha   Number of Items 
 
Trust        .91       4  
Commitment      .91       4 
Integration       .96       2 
Utilization       .94       5 
Financial Performance   .89       3   
Non-financial Performance  .95       3 
 
 
 
Table 11 
Exploratory Factor Analysis for Control Variables1 
                Factor  
 1 2 
Host Government Interference1  .723 
Host Government Interference2  .961 
Host Government Interference3  .898 
Host Government Interference4  .487 
Technology Turbulence1 .693  
Technology Turbulence2 .880  
Technology Turbulence3 .892  
Technology Turbulence4 .833  
1 Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood 
  Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization. 
   Note: Factor loadings less than .25 are not shown for interpretability. 
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Table 12 
Reliability for Control Variables 
Factor         Coefficient Alpha  Number of Items 
Host Government Interference   .85      4   
 
Technology Turbulence     .89      4 
 
 
Partial Disaggregation 
 
For tests of the SEMs, individual items were used to operationalize constructs. 
Each factor (latent variables) was operationalized with indicators comprised of subsets 
of items in which each indicator is constructed as the sum (or average) of two or more 
items.  This process is known as a ‘partial disaggregation’ approach to SEM (Bagozzi 
and Edwards 1998).  This approach has the advantages of reducing the number of 
parameters in a model and tends to decrease measurement error (Bagozzi and Edwards 
1998).  Therefore, the model can run with smaller sample sizes and generally produces 
better fits (Bergami and Bagozzi 2000).  Because the model specified for this research 
would require a much larger sample size than 162 for estimating all the parameters at the 
individual item level and does not meet the minimum ratio of sample size to the number 
of free parameters (5:1) as specified in Bagozzi and Yi (1988), the partial disaggregation 
model was employed.  
Following the partial disaggregation approach, each factor (latent variable) was 
made up of two indicators where each consisted of the average of two or three items 
intended to measure each factor.  When there are four (five) items for a latent variable, 
the first and third (and fifth) items (e.g., item 1 and 3 or item 1, item 3, and item 5) were 
averaged for one indicator and the other two even numbered items were averaged for the 
    
89
other indicator (one even numbered item was used as an indicator in case there were 
only three items).  Table 13 shows the correlations, means, and standard deviations of 
the items used for the CFA with this approach.  The table on page 97 compares the 
model fit indices with the partial disaggregation approach versus the model fit indices 
without the approach2.  The indices generally improved when the partial disaggregation 
approach was used.  
However, Bagozzi and Edwards (1998) indicate that the partial disaggregation  
approach should be used only under certain conditions.  If the hypothesized 
items for a factor either share more variation with items from other factors or fail to load 
highly and uniformly on the proper factor, any combination of items can be misleading.  
This requires a careful development of items and the individual item level support by 
using EFAs, which was done in this study. 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis With the Partial Disaggregation Approach 
Since EFA is a preliminary technique and does not provide an explicit test for factor 
unidimensionality (Anderson and Gerbing 1988), factors with indicators formed by the 
partial disaggregation approach were subjected to CFA to ensure whether each factor 
exhibits convergent and discriminant validity.  Convergent validity is defined as the 
agreement among measures of the same factor.  Convergent validity is established when 
a CFA model fits satisfactorily and all factor loadings are significantly and preferably 
“high” (Bagozzi, Yi, and Phillips 1991)(Note: A single-factor model for all individual  
                                                          
2 See Appendix 2 for the correlations, means, standard deviations, and standard errors  
before the partial disaggregation approach was applied.   
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Tab1e 13 
     Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations Among Indicators With the Partial Disaggregation Approach 
 RC13 RC24 TS13 TS24 CF13 CF2 CI13 CI2 CW13 CW2 CP13 CP2 CS13 CS24 
RC13 1              
RC24 0.543 1             
TS13 0.374 0.608 1            
TS24 0.426 0.626 0.781 1           
CFF13 0.168 0.154 0.455 0.389 1          
CF2 0.190 0.088 0.279 0.279 0.473 1         
CI13 0.259 0.415 0.528 0.528 0.336 0.157 1        
CI2 0.286 0.320 0.470 0.445 0.294 0.495 0.629 1       
CW13 0.390 0.574 0.602 0.688 0.393 0.305 0.566 0.503 1      
CW2 0.386 0.495 0.683 0.651 0.337 0.307 0.534 0.513 0.704 1     
CP13 0.310 0.431 0.553 0.587 0.547 0.380 0.477 0.430 0.657 0.533 1    
CP2 0.241 0.372 0.526 0.539 0.540 0.387 0.430 0.389 0.561 0.456 0.857 1   
CS13 0.389 0.540 0.610 0.724 0.362 0.230 0.438 0.411 0.640 0.542 0.587 0.507 1  
CS24 0.479 0.587 0.644 0.715 0.326 0.272 0.425 0.423 0.593 0.615 0.519 0.437 0.850 1 
TR13 0.382 0.613 0.698 0.731 0.317 0.283 0.423 0.360 0.614 0.602 0.516 0.455 0.648 0.701 
TR24 0.403 0.622 0.705 0.780 0.301 0.224 0.486 0.409 0.601 0.595 0.539 0.474 0.657 0.674 
CT13 0.435 0.600 0.603 0.703 0.364 0.221 0.484 0.336 0.651 0.574 0.608 0.579 0.638 0.634 
CT24 0.427 0.611 0.653 0.755 0.408 0.304 0.467 0.436 0.676 0.604 0.626 0.545 0.701 0.706 
IT1 0.244 0.438 0.489 0.425 0.369 0.201 0.382 0.306 0.413 0.353 0.511 0.437 0.405 0.389 
IT2 0.273 0.486 0.549 0.500 0.401 0.246 0.450 0.350 0.483 0.393 0.572 0.528 0.474 0.464 
UT135 0.349 0.544 0.695 0.693 0.511 0.349 0.424 0.387 0.591 0.532 0.711 0.631 0.681 0.691 
UT24 0.288 0.474 0.637 0.648 0.504 0.336 0.427 0.358 0.585 0.482 0.692 0.620 0.635 0.625 
FP13 0.320 0.420 0.487 0.473 0.286 0.206 0.354 0.264 0.436 0.432 0.323 0.272 0.408 0.393 
FP2 0.178 0.341 0.431 0.423 0.277 0.245 0.278 0.200 0.398 0.388 0.353 0.287 0.337 0.341 
NP13 0.320 0.382 0.452 0.437 0.245 0.177 0.356 0.378 0.382 0.382 0.347 0.326 0.390 0.424 
NP2 0.243 0.421 0.474 0.467 0.307 0.200 0.352 0.314 0.420 0.406 0.411 0.350 0.427 0.482 
HI13 0.032 -0.067 -0.105 -0.115 -0.049 -0.131 -0.018 -0.052 0.073 0.011 -0.019 -0.020 0.016 0.001 
HI24 0.059 -0.012 -0.035 -0.171 -0.014 -0.054 -0.060 -0.063 0.103 -0.052 -0.017 -0.051 -0.035 -0.021 
TT13 0.115 0.002 -0.040 0.008 0.012 0.025 0.078 -0.001 0.087 0.084 0.105 0.132 0.067 0.008 
TT24 0.184 0.069 0.026 0.063 0.052 0.094 0.111 0.056 0.038 0.098 0.161 0.201 0.144 0.077 
MN 4.840 4.979 4.904 5.086 4.537 4.611 5.133 5.124 4.759 4.667 4.676 4.833 4.880 4.472 
SD 1.372 1.392 1.350 1.368 1.430 1.836 1.453 1.667 1.362 1.487 1.511 1.605 1.381 1.441 
Note: RC= reciprocity, TS= transparency, CF= formal communication, CI=informal communication, CW= two-way communication, CP= participative     
  communication, CS=cultural sensitivity, TR=trust, CT=commitment, IT= integration, UT= utilization, FP= financial performance, NP= non-financial       
  performance  HI=host government interference, TT=technology turbulence, MN=mean, SD: standard deviation 
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Table13 (continued) 
 TR13 TR24 CT13 CT24 IT1 IT2 
UT13
5 UT24 FP13 FP2 NP13 NP2 HI13 HI24 TT13 TT24 
RC13                 
RC24                 
TS13                 
TS24                 
CF13                 
CF2                 
CI13                 
CF2                 
CW13                 
CW2                 
CP13                 
CP2                 
CS13                 
CS24                 
TR13 1                
TR24 0.863 1               
CT13 0.779 0.787 1              
CT24 0.786 0.779 0.862 1             
IT1 0.500 0.462 0.467 0.459 1            
IT2 0.537 0.511 0.526 0.527 0.924 1           
UT135 0.688 0.638 0.640 0.733 0.570 0.638 1          
UT24 0.648 0.591 0.622 0.688 0.617 0.696 0.871 1         
FP13 0.475 0.431 0.414 0.449 0.330 0.374 0.430 0.409 1        
FP2 0.386 0.332 0.313 0.358 0.181 0.230 0.418 0.342 0.764 1       
NP13 0.445 0.424 0.406 0.441 0.385 0.390 0.426 0.419 0.659 0.550 1      
NP2 0.456 0.432 0.444 0.462 0.330 0.350 0.485 0.496 0.633 0.641 0.856 1     
HI13 -0.074 -0.125 0.005 -0.008 0.051 0.013 -0.003 -0.001 0.141 0.124 0.044 0.046 1    
HI24 -0.092 -0.124 -0.032 -0.016 0.032 0.000 0.013 0.059 0.083 0.063 0.098 0.091 0.770 1   
TT13 -0.115 -0.005 0.038 -0.052 -0.015 0.008 0.061 0.008 -0.013 -0.027 0.047 0.044 -0.026 -0.058 1  
TT24 0.038 0.121 0.178 0.063 0.057 0.095 0.124 0.091 0.043 -0.033 0.085 0.033 -0.058 -0.070 0.823 1 
MN 4.370 4.920 4.969 4.765 4.630 4.488 4.304 4.494 4.355 3.994 4.694 4.528 2.356 2.830 4.854 4.863 
SD 1.523 1.455 1.400 1.503 1.540 1.577 1.359 1.398 1.581 1.602 1.441 1.523 1.515 1.481 1.526 1.558 
Note: RC= reciprocity, TS= transparency, CF= formal communication, CI=informal communication, CW= two-way communication, CP= participative communication,  
     CS=cultural sensitivity, TR=trust, CT=commitment, IT= integration, UT= utilization, FP= financial performance, NP= non-financial performance, HI=host       
     government interference, TT=technology turbulence, MN=mean, SD=standard deviation 
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items hypothesized to measure the factor before the partial disaggregation approach was  
employed was used to measure all the  factor loadings.  See Appendix B).   Discriminant 
validity refers to the distinctiveness of the factors measured by different sets of 
indicators (Kline 1998, p. 60).  A perfect correlation between factors would indicate that 
the factors are not discriminable.  Discriminant validity among factors exists when the 
construct correlation is less than 1.00 by an amount greater than twice its respective 
standard error (Bagozzi et al. 1991; Bagozzi and Warshaw 1990).   
Exogenous factors, endogenous factors, and control variables were subjected to a 
CFA.  First, a seven-factor model CFA with exogenous factors was conducted.  The 
CFA results demonstrate a significant chi-square statistic of 127.91 (df=56, p=.00) but 
exhibit reasonable model fit indices: the RMSEA=.086, the NNFI=.97, the CFI=.98, and 
the SRMR=.04.  Table 14 demonstrates the degree of discriminant validity among 
exogenous factors.  Though the EFA results exhibit that reciprocity, transparency, and 
two-way communication highly loaded on the same factor, the CFA results demonstrate 
that each is a unique factor as shown in Table 14.   
Endogenous factors (i.e., trust, commitment, integration, utilization, financial 
performance, and non-financial performance) and control variables (i.e., host 
government interference and technology turbulence) were also subjected to a CFA.  
Trust and commitment have been widely used as distinctive factors in the alliance and 
marketing literature (Morgan and Hunt 1994; Rodríguez 2002; Wilson 1995).  However, 
because the EFA results indicated that trust and commitment loaded highly on the same 
factor, a two-factor model CFA with trust and commitment was done to make sure 
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Table 14 
Correlations, Standard Errors and T-Values Among Exogenous Factors1 
 REC TRSP CTW CF CIF CP CS 
REC 1.00       
TRSP 0.77 1.00      
 (0.06)       
 13.5       
CTW 0.71 0.87 1.00     
 (0.06) (0.04)      
 11.25 24.25      
CF 0.22 0.57 0.56 1.00    
 (0.10) (0.08) (0.08)     
 2.22 7.08 6.67     
CIF 0.52 0.70 0.79 0.52 1.00   
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.09)    
 6.53 11.78 14.67 5.81    
CP 0.49 0.67 0.73 0.70 0.59 1.00  
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07)   
 6.72 12.79 15.03 10.38 8.92   
CS 0.69 0.83 0.77 0.46 0.58 0.61 1.00 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06)  
 11.37 24.2 17.04 5.48 8.44 10.92  
          Note: REC=reciprocity, TRSP=transparency, CTW= two-way communication 
                  CF=formal communication, CIF=informal communication,  
                  CP=participative communication, CS=cultural sensitivity 
               1 Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  
 
that they are separate factors.  The CFA results in Table 15 show that trust and 
commitment correlate highly but exhibit different factors.  The chi-square statistics by 
the CFA is 71.84(df=1, p=.00).  The goodness of fit statistics show the RMSEA=.00, the 
NNFI=1.00, the CFI=1.00, and the SRMR=.024, which are acceptable fit indices (see the 
table on page 97 for the fit indices).  
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Table 15 
Correlation, Standard Error, and T-Value Among Trust and Commitment1 
 Trust Commitment
Trust 1.00  
Commitment 0.91 1.00 
 (0.02)  
 41.76  
                                   1Number in parenthesis indicates standard error 
 
A two-factor model CFA for integration and utilization was done to ascertain 
whether the two ACE components are distinctive factors.  The CFA with integration and 
utilization was conducted twice because the first CFA with full integration and 
utilization indicators (i.e., five indicators for each) resulted in poor goodness of fit 
indices: the chi- square statistic =369.54(df=34, p=.00), the RMSEA=.25, the NNFI=.88, 
the CFI =.91, and the SRMR= .15, though integration and utilization show discriminant 
validity (i.e., the correlation=.74, the standard error=.04, and the t-value=18.33).   
After the first CFA, three indicators of integration (integration 3, integration 4, 
and integration 5) were deleted because integration 4 and integration 5 loaded highly on 
utilization (.680 and .818, respectively) and integration 3 loaded on two factors (.447 for 
factor 1 and .303 for factor 2) by use of the EFA.  Given that measures of integration 
loaded highly on the utilization factor and integration 1 loaded on two factors, the three 
indicators in question were removed from further analysis.  Two indicators of integration 
(integration 1 and integration 2) and the two partial disaggregated utilization indicators 
(i.e., the aggregation of utilization 1, 3, and 5 and the aggregation of utilization 2 and 4) 
were therefore subjected to a CFA.  The CFA results in Table 16 show that the measures 
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achieve discriminant validity (the correlation =. 70, the standard error =. 04, and the t-
value=15.60) between integration and utilization.  The table on page 97 reports 
acceptable fit indices: the chi-square=.087 (df=1, p=.77), the RMSEA= .00, the 
NNFI=1.00, the CFI=1.00, and the SRMR=.015.    
 
Table 16 
Correlation, Standard Error, and T-Value Among Integration and Utilization1 
 Integration Utilization
Integration 1.00  
Utilization 0.70 1.00 
 (0.04)  
 15.60  
1Number in parenthesis indicates standard error 
 
Financial and non-financial performance factors were also subjected to a CFA 
with a two-factor model.  Much of the ISA literature has addressed the two different 
performance measurement criteria (Cullen et al. 2000; Ding 1997; Mjoen and 
Tallman1997; Roboson et al. 2002; Sarkar et al. 2001b).  However, since the two 
performance criteria loaded highly on the same factor by use of the EFA, the purpose of 
doing a CFA was to verify whether they truly indicate the same factor.  The CFA results 
are shown in Table 17.  The CFA reports that the two performance measures are distinct 
measures (i.e., discriminant validity is achieved) and show generally acceptable fit 
indices, except for the RMSEA and NNFI: the chi-square=17.64(df=1, p=.00), the 
RMSEA=.31, the NNFI= .78, the CFI=.96, and the SRMR=.02 (see the table on page 97 
for the fit indices).  
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Table 17 
Correlation, Standard Error, and T-Value Among Performance Factors1 
 
Financial 
Performance 
Non-financial 
Performance 
Financial 
Performance 1.00  
Non-financial 
Performance 0.77 1.00 
 (0.04)  
 17.93  
                     1Number in parenthesis indicates standard error 
 
A two-factor model CFA for control variables, host government interference and 
technology turbulence, was conducted.  Table 18 reports the correlation, standard error, 
and t-value for the control variables, which indicate that the two variables are distinct 
variables.  The goodness of fit indices for the control variables exhibit generally 
acceptable fit indices: a significant chi-square statistic of .58(df=1, p=.45), the 
RMSEA=.00, the NNFI=1.00, the CFI=1.00, and the SRMR=.007(see Table 19 for the 
fit indices). 
 
Table 18 
Correlation, Standard Error, and T-Value Among Control Variables1 
 
Host Government 
Interference 
Technology 
Turbulence 
Host Government 
Interference 1.00  
Technology 
Turbulence 
-0.07 1.00 
 (0.09)  
 -0.74  
   1 Number in parenthesis indicates standard error
 97
Table 19 
The Goodness of Fit Indices Without/With the Partial Disaggregation Approach1 
Factors df chi-square p-value RMSEA NNFI CFI SRMR 
EXOGENOUS 231/56 482.57/127.91 0.00/0.00 0.078/0.086 0.96/0.97 0.97/0.98 0.06/0.04 
TR & CMIT 19/1 71.84/0.48 0.00/0.49 0.12/0.00 0.96/1 0.97/1 .038/0.024 
IT & UT 13/1 27.63/0.087 0.012/0.77 0.084/0.00 0.99/1 0.99/1 0.029/0.0015 
FOP & NFOP 8/1 49.99/17.64 0.00/0.00 0.17/0.31 0.93/0.78 0.96/0.96 0.031/0.02 
HGI & TET 19/1 33.01/.58 0.024/0.45 0.072/0.00 0.96/1 0.98/1 0.036/.007 
 Note: EXOGENOUS: reciprocity, transparency, formal and information communication, participative and two-way     
communication, and cultural sensitivity, TR=trust, CMIT=commitment, IT=integration, UT=utilization,  
FOP=financial performance, NFOP=non-financial performance, HGI=host government interference,  
TET=technology turbulence  
 1 Numbers before / indicate indices without the partial disaggregation approach.  
    Numbers after / indicate indices with the partial disaggregation approach. 
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Summary 
 
This chapter addressed the findings from the data analysis about the sample and 
the measurement model.  Exploratory factor analysis and confirmatory factor analysis 
were used to find out whether each indicator truly represented each factor.  A partial 
disaggregation approach was used to reduce the parameter constraint for the structural 
model tests.  The next chapter will discuss the procedures for testing the hypotheses and 
the results.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
TESTS OF MODELS AND HYPOTHESES 
In this chapter, the structural model with the hypotheses was analyzed using 
LISREL 8.54 with the partial disaggregated indicators specified in Table 13.  The model 
with the proposed hypotheses was presented in Chapter III.  The moderating effects of 
market environment turbulence (i.e., host government interference and technology 
turbulence) on the relationship between ACE and ISA performance were investigated by 
multiple regression analysis.  
The Structural Model: Tests of Models 
The Proposed and First Revised Model 
The structural model with the proposed hypotheses in Figure 2 was analyzed by 
using the measurement model in which the partial disaggregation approach was 
employed (see Table 13)(Note: this structural model is called the proposed model).   
Table 20 illustrates the results of the LISREL analysis.  Though the analysis results show 
acceptable fit indices, only six out of sixteen hypotheses were significant 
(|t|>2), which is contrary to expectations given in the alliance and relationship literature 
as addressed in Chapter II and III.  In the next model, a second order factor which 
underlies reciprocity, transparency, and two-way communication was introduced to 
further investigate the hypotheses because the three factors loaded highly on the same 
factor by use of the EFA.  The proposed model was revised as shown in Figure 3.  This 
model is called the first revised model.  In this model, a second order factor, partial 
alliance partnership interaction (PAPI) with reciprocity, transparency, and two-way
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Figure 2 
 Tests of the Proposed Model 
 
       Note1:  REC=reciprocity, TRSP=transparency, CF=formal communication, CIF=informal communication,  
           CTW=two-way communication, CP=participative communication, CS=cultural sensitivity, TRST=trust,  
           COMMIT=commitment, INTEG=integration, UTIL=utilization, FOP=financial performance,  
           NFOP=non-financial performance 
       Note 2: Correlated error terms for INTG and UTIL and for FOP and NFOP omitted for simplicity.  
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Table 20 
 Test Results of the Proposed Model 
Path Standardized Estimate T-Value 
Gamma   
Reciprocity                                             Trust .100 .968 
Transparency                                         Trust .672 3.391 
Formal Communication                         Trust -.033 -.032 
Informal Communication                      Trust -.075 -0.740 
Two-way Communication                     Trust .014 .077 
Participative Communication                Trust .127 1.378 
Cultural Sensitivity               Trust .169 1.726 
Beta Standardized Estimate T-Value 
Trust                                          Commitment .932 15.660 
Trust                                           Integration .577 2.290 
Trust                                          Utilization .622 2.977 
Commitment                              Integration .018 .074 
Commitment                              Utilization .210 1.015 
Integration                        Financial Performance -.006 -.054 
Integration                        Non-financial Performance -.026 -.262 
Utilization                       Financial Performance .517 4.618 
Utilization                       Non-financial Performance .571 5.338 
Chi-square=496.643(df=260, p=.00)   
RMSEA=.07, NNFI=.98, CFI=.99, SRMR=.07  
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communication as first order factors, was introduced.  It is thus assumed that there is a 
higher order factor that underlies the three first order factors.  Formal, informal, and 
participative communication, and cultural sensitivity were considered unique factors as 
indicated by the EFA and CFA analysis.  Integration and utilization were also considered 
separate factors by the CFA analysis as they were in the proposed model.  Table 21 
reports the results of the first revised model by the LISREL analysis.  The goodness of 
fit statistics produce generally reasonable results: the chi-square =535. 206(df=271, 
p=.00), the RMSEA=.07, the NNFI= .98, the CFI of .98, and the SRMR=.09).    
The effect of PAPI on trust is shown by β1.  The relative contributions of 
reciprocity, transparency, and two-way communication as subdimensions of PAPI are 
indicated by the standardized parameter estimates, β2, β3, and β4, respectively.  Among 
the three second order factors, transparency has higher contribution to trust than two-
way communication and reciprocity (two-way communication contributes more to trust 
than reciprocity to trust; see standardized estimates in Table 21).  However, other 
exogenous factors (formal, informal, and participative communication, and cultural 
sensitivity) still do not show significant effects on trust as they did not in the proposed 
model.  Trust significantly affects commitment, integration, and utilization as it did n the 
proposed model.  However, commitment shows the same non-significant effects on 
integration and utilization contrary to the proposed model.  Integration still does not 
significantly affect financial and non-financial performance.  Utilization has significant 
effects on financial and non-financial performance.  
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Figure 3 
 Tests of the First Revised Model 
 
 
Note1:  PAPI=partial alliance partnership interaction, REC=reciprocity, TRSP=transparency,  
CF=formal communication, CIF=informal communication, CTW=two-way communication,  
CP=participative communication, CS=cultural sensitivity, TRST=trust, COMMIT=commitment,  
INTEG=integration, UTIL=utilization, FOP=financial performance, NFOP=non-financial performance 
Note 2: Correlations among exogenous factors, PAPI, CF, CIF, CP, and CS omitted for simplicity. 
Note 3: Correlated error terms for INTG and UTIL and for FOP and NFOP also omitted for simplicity. 
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Table 21 
 Test Results of the First Revised Model 
Path Standardized Estimate T-Value 
Gamma   
Formal Communication                       Trust -.004 -.051 
Informal Communication                     Trust .216 -1.919 
Participative Communication               Trust .025 .274 
Cultural Sensitivity                              Trust .017 .119 
Beta Standardized Estimate T-Value 
PAPI                             Trust 1.076 4.976 
PAPI                             Reciprocity .865 6.296 
PAPI                             Transparency .968 13.998 
PAPI                         Two-way Communication .928 13.154 
Trust                             Commitment .942 17.065 
Trust                             Integration .580 2.174 
Trust                             Utilization .619 2.854 
Commitment                Integration .040 0.151 
Commitment                Utilization .228 1.055 
Integration               Financial Performance -.005 -.052 
Integration            Non-financial Performance -.026 -.263 
Utilization              Financial Performance .536 4.741 
Utilization            Non-financial Performance .591 5.485 
Chi-square=532.206(df=271, p=.00) 
RMSEA=.07, NNFI=.98, CFI=.98, SRMR=.09 
Note: PAPI=partial alliance partnership alliance
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The Second Revised Model  
 
Several points regarding the results of the first revised model analysis are 
noteworthy.  First is the introduction of alliance partnership interaction, API, as the 
higher order factor that underlies all exogenous factors.  PAPI was proposed as the 
second order factor only for reciprocity, transparency, and two-way communication in 
the first revised model.  The argument that the higher second order factor, API, should 
include all the exogenous factors as first order factors is based on 1) the high correlations 
between the exogenous factors (see Table 14), 2) the high correlations of each 
exogenous factor with trust (see Table 13), and 3) theoretical foundations which may 
underlie API.  The correlations between all the exogenous factors are high such that it is 
possible that the high correlations (i.e., the multicollinearity between the factors) may 
hamper the actual effects of formal, informal, and participative communication, and 
cultural sensitivity on trust, contrary to expectations.  The high correlations of each 
exogenous factor with trust also indicate that all the factors may have one underlying 
factor, a higher secondary order factor, for them.  The alliance and relationship literature 
also suggest that formal, informal, and participative communication and cultural 
sensitivity are also important qualities which are necessary between the involved parties 
or alliance partners to bring positive relationships to them (Anderson and Narus 1990; 
Fisher et al. 1997; Johnson et al. 1996; Mohr and Spekman 1994; Sarkar et al. 2001b).  It 
is, therefore, reasonable to include all of the exogenous factors as the first order factors 
of a second order factor, API.  The second order factor, API, thus, underlies all of the 
exogenous factors.   
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The second point that can be made regarding the first revised model results is the 
introduction of another second order factor that can contain integration and utilization.  
The CFA analysis indicated that integration and utilization are distinctive factors, but 
they can be components of the higher order factor, alliance coordination effectiveness 
(ACE), which allows alliance partners to effectively manage their resources to achieve 
alliance objectives.  Since ACE involves effective cooperation between alliance partners 
to achieve their objectives (Sivadas and Dwyer 2000), it can underlie integration and 
utilization.  The high correlation between integration and utilization (.70) also indicates 
that there is an underlying dimension for integration and utilization.  Therefore, it can be 
concluded that integration and utilization correlate highly but as separate factors, which 
are subdimensions of ACE.  
API, thus, has all the exogenous factors as its first order factors.  ACE also has 
integration and utilization as its first order factors.  The first revised model has been 
revised as shown in Figure 4 (this model is called the second revised model).  The results 
of the LISREL analysis based on the second revised model are reported in Table 22.  
The goodness of fit statistics exhibit generally acceptable fit results except for the 
SRMR: the chi-square=599. 599(df=285, p=.00), the RMSEA=.07, the NNFI= .97, the 
CFI=.98, and the SRMR=.115.   
In the second revised model, API significantly influences trust as indicated by 
β8.  The relative contributions of the second order factors are indicated by the 
standardized parameter estimates, β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, β6, and β7.  Among these 
subdimensions of API, transparency (β1), two-way communication (β5), and cultural  
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Figure 4 
 Tests of the Second Revised Model  
 
Note1: API=alliance partnership interaction, REC=Reciprocity, TRSP=transparency,  
CTW=two-way communication,  CF=formal communication, CIF-=informal communication,  
CP=participative communication, CS=cultural sensitivity, TRST=trust, COMMIT: commitment,  
INTEG=integration, UTIL=utilization, ACE=alliance coordination effectiveness,  
FOP=financial performance, NFOP=non-financial performance 
Note 2: Correlated error term for FOP and NFOP omitted for simplicity. 
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Table 22 
 Test Results of the Second Revised Model 
Path Standardized Estimate T-Value 
Beta1   
API                       Reciprocity .864 6.276 
API                       Transparency .965 13.836 
API                       Formal Communication .610 6.625 
API                       Informal Communication .749 9.837 
API                      Two-way Communication .942 12.214 
API                      Participative Communication .745 11.152 
API                           Cultural Sensitivity .879 13.182 
API                           Trust .932 14.699 
Trust                         Commitment .940 17.293 
Trust                         ACE .500 2.014 
Commitment             ACE .262 1.066 
ACE                          Integration .830 9.361 
ACE                         Utilization .978 14.299 
ACE                         Financial Performance .561 7.014 
ACE                   Non-financial Performance .605 7.798 
Chi-square=599.599 (df=285, p=.00)   
RMSEA=.07, NNFI=.97, CFI=.97, SRMR=.115  
1 Eta (η) was used for every factor. 
Note: API= alliance partnership interaction   ACE=alliance coordination effectiveness 
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sensitivity (β7) show relatively high contributions to trust.  Formal communication (β3), 
informal communication (β4), and participative communication (β6) show relatively low 
contributions to trust.  The higher order factor, ACE, positively influences financial and 
non-financial performance.   
Even in the second proposed model, commitment does not significantly affect 
ACE.  Though commitment has been a well-established and separate construct from trust 
in the relationship and alliance literature (Dwyer et al. 1987; Gundlach et al. 1995; 
Morgan and Hunt 1994), trust and commitment turned out to be essentially the same 
factor in this research (correlation of .91).  Their high correlation may prevent the 
investigation of the correct effects of commitment on integration, utilization, and even 
ACE.  In the relationship marketing literature, both trust and commitment are assumed to 
be important factors which give positive motivation to act together and encourage 
alliance partners to work together by cooperating with each other, bringing joint action 
to exchange partners (Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995; Morgan and Hunt 1994; 
Ruyter, Moorman, and Lemmink 2001).  Therefore, a further investigation which has 
another higher order factor, Desire for Joint Action (DJA) that contains trust and 
commitment as first order factors, was conducted.  The third revised model, Figure 5, 
thus, has three higher order factors.  The results of the LISREL analysis for the third 
revised model are reported in Table 23.  Though the chi-square statistic shows a non-
significant result (χ2 = 633.498, df=286, p=.00) and the RMSMR is a little bit high 
(.129), the goodness of fit statistics exhibit generally acceptable fit results: the 
RMSEA=.07, the NNFI=.97, and the CFI=.97. 
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Figure 5 
 Tests of the Third Revised Model 
 
 
Note1: API=alliance partnership interaction, REC=Reciprocity, TRSP=transparency,  
CTW=two-way communication, CF=formal communication, CIF=informal communication,  
CP=participative communication, CS=cultural sensitivity, DJA=desire for joint action, TRST=trust,  
COMMIT=commitment, INTEG=integration, UTIL=utilization, ACE=alliance coordination effectiveness,  
FOP=financial performance, NFOP=non-financial performance 
Note 2: Correlated error term for FOP and NFOP omitted for simplicity. 
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Table 23 
 Test Results of the Third Revised Model 
Path Standardized Estimate T-Value 
Beta1 
  
API                       Reciprocity .862 6.293 
API                       Transparency .965 13.836 
API                       Formal Communication .628 6.832 
API                       Informal Communication .768 9.837 
API                      Two-way Communication .942 12.046 
API                      Participative Communication .758 11.398 
API                      Cultural Sensitivity .875 13.078 
API                      DJA .815 11.827 
DJA                     Trust .968 17.586 
DJA                    Commitment .969 19.153 
DJA                    ACE .774 10.318 
ACE                   Integration .840 10.17 
ACE                   Utilization .980 14.698 
ACE                   Financial Performance .575 7.258 
ACE                   Non-financial Performance .619 8.069 
Chi-square=633.498 (df=286, p=.00)   
RMSEA=.07, NNFI=.97, CFI=.97 SRMR=.129  
1 Eta (η) was used for every factor. 
Note: API=alliance partnership interaction, DJA=Desire for Joint Action    
          ACE=alliance coordination effectiveness 
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The difference between the second and third revised model is the introduction of 
DJA as a higher order factor for trust and commitment as mentioned earlier.  All path 
results are the same between the second and third revised model, but in the third revised 
model, DJA positively influences ACE and commitment positively contributes to ACE.  
The third revised model becomes more refined and explains the proposed model, 
Figure 1, more parsimoniously. 
Additional Path Analyses and the Final Model 
Three additional relationships (paths) were tested to enhance understanding of how the 
partnership development factors relate to each other.  The additional paths are 1) from 
alliance partnership interaction (API) to alliance coordination effectiveness (ACE), 2) 
from Desire for Joint Action (DJA) to financial performance, and 3) from Desire for 
Joint Action (DJA) to non-financial performance.  Each path was added to the third 
revised model one at a time to test whether it had significant effects.  Chi-square 
differences between the third revised model and a model with each additional path were 
compared.  When there is a significant chi-square difference between the third revised 
model and the model with each additional path, the path was added to the second revised 
model in order to generate the final model.  Table 24 shows the results of chi-square 
differences and significance levels based on the chi square differences.  The results 
indicate that only the path from API to DJA is significant, which shows that DJA is a 
partial mediator between API and ACE.  The path was added to the final model, Figure 
5.  The two other paths were not significant, which indicates that ACE is a mediator 
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between DJA and financial performance measures.  Only the significant path was added 
to the final model, Figure 5, and the test results of the final model are shown in Table 25. 
 
Table 24 
Additional Path Analysis Results 
Path Chi-square Difference P-Value 
API             DJA 17.784 .00 
DJA            FOP 3.023 .08 
DJA            NFOP .875 .35 
               Note: API=alliance partnership interaction, DJA: desire for joint action,   
                         FOP=financial performance, NFOP= non-financial performance 
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Figure 6 
Tests of the Final Model 
 
Note1: API=alliance partnership interaction, REC=Reciprocity, TRSP=transparency, CTW=two-way communication,  
CF=formal  communication, CIF=informal communication, CP=participative communication,  
CS=cultural sensitivity, DJA=desire for joint action, TRST=trust, COMMIT=commitment,  
INTEG=integration, UTIL=utilization, ACE=alliance coordination effectiveness, FOP=financial performance,  
NFOP=non-financial performance 
Note 2: Correlated error term for FOP and NFOP omitted for simplicity. 
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Table 25 
 Test Results of the Final Model 
Path Standardized Estimate T-Value 
Beta1   
API                        Reciprocity .859 6.195 
API                       Transparency .966 13.979 
API                       Formal Communication .638 7.020 
API                       Informal Communication .765 9.363 
API                      Two-way Communication .937 12.263 
API                      Participative Communication .769 11.647 
API                      Cultural Sensitivity .810 13.167 
API                      DJA .815 11.77 
DJA                     Trust .977 17.74 
DJA                     Commitment .961 18.327 
DJA                     ACE .240 2.203 
ACE                     Integration .838 10.382 
ACE                     Utilization .982 14.85 
ACE                    Financial Performance .572 7.215 
ACE                    Non-financial Performance .614 7.973 
API                      ACE .574 4.934 
Chi-square=615.714 (df=285, p=.00)   
RMSEA=.07, NNFI=.97, CFI=.97,  SRMR=.126  
 1 Eta (η) was used for every factor.    
Note: API=alliance partnership interaction, DJA=Desire for Joint Action,  
         ACE=alliance coordination effectiveness 
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Moderating Effects of Market Environment Turbulence on the Relationship 
Between ACE and ISA Performance 
The moderating effects of market environment turbulence (i.e., host government 
interference and technology turbulence) on the relationship between ACE and ISA 
performance were tested by moderated multiple regression analysis.  A multi-group 
analysis was not conducted because the split number of the collected sample size is only 
81, which does not exceed the minimum sample size (N=100) needed for a SEM 
multigroup analysis (Hair et al. 1998).   
A concern regarding the use of the moderated multiple regression analysis is the 
possible multicollinearity between the interaction terms and other factors.  To reduce the 
problems of the multicollinearity, each scale substituting an interaction term was mean-
centered (Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken et al. 2003).  Mean-centering is a rescaling 
procedure by which the mean of the predictor is subtracted from each score on the 
predictor, reducing nonessential multicollinearity in a regression model containing 
interactions (Cohen et al. 2003).  
The predictors (i.e., ACE, host government interference, and technology 
turbulence) were mean-centered.  But each dependent variable (financial and non-
financial performance) was not mean-centered (Cohen et al. 2003).  In the case of ACE, 
the composite mean of integration and utilization was mean-centered.  Then, the 
interaction terms were created by multiplying the mean-centered ACE and the mean-
centered HGI and TET.  The moderating effects of host government interference and 
technology turbulence on the relationship between ACE and ISA financial performance 
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(Table 26) and on the relationship between ACE and ISA non-financial performance 
(Table 27) are reported.  As expected, ACE has a significant effect on financial and non-
financial performance.  However, the interactions between ACE and host government 
interference and between ACE and technology turbulence do not have significant effects 
on both financial and non-financial ISA performance. 
 
 
Table 26 
Interaction Effects of ACE and Control Variables on Financial Performance1 
 Beta T-Value P-Value  
HGI .080 1.140 .256 
TET .039 .551 .582 
ACE .463 6.611 .000 
ACE x HGI .110 1.567 .119 
ACE x TET .032 .452 .652 
     
 
 
Table 27 
 Interaction Effects of ACE and Control Variables on Non-Financial Performance1 
 Beta T-Value P-Value 
HGI .109 1.142 .140 
TET -.016 -.218 .828 
ACE .399 5.461 .000 
ACE x HGI .021 .280 .780 
ACE x TET .063 .851 .396 
                    Note: HGI: host government interference, 
                              TET: technology turbulence 
                       ACE: alliance coordination effectiveness 
                              1  Predictors are mean-centered in Table 26 and 27.    
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CHAPTER VII 
 
DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND CONCLUSION 
 
This final chapter addresses a discussion of the final results, implications for 
managers and researchers, and future research directions based on the limitations of the 
study.  A brief concluding remark is also presented in the final section. 
Discussion of Findings 
Research questions in this dissertation were raised by the lack of post-ISA 
formation issues.  These issues include: 1) the need to investigate the factors affecting 
ISA partnership development, 2) the management of resources contributed by each 
alliance partner, and 3) the impact of the effective management of resources on ISA 
performance.  The antecedents of trust and the alliance coordination effectiveness (ACE) 
concept were introduced to address these research questions.  Items for each factor 
(latent variable) were refined by the EFA and CFA.  The proposed model in Figure 1 
was tested and modified to find out more precise relationships between factors and a 
more parsimonious model for this study.  For example, in the first revised model, the 
effects of the three first order factors for PAPI (partial alliance partnership interaction), 
identified by the EFA results on trust, were tested.  The introduction of the two higher 
order factors in the second revised model (i.e., alliance partnership interaction and 
alliance coordination effectiveness) was based on theoretical foundations that underlie 
the factors and the correlations between the factors involved.  The final model 
introduced a higher order factor for trust and commitment (i.e., desire for joint action) 
and an additional significant path from alliance partnership interaction (API) to alliance 
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coordination effectiveness (ACE) was tested and added.  The findings are generally 
discussed based on the final model. 
Exogenous Factors and Trust 
The first research question was to investigate how ISA partners develop their 
relationships after an ISA is formed.  This study identified trust as the most important 
factor necessary for ISA partners to develop for successful relationships.  The exogenous 
factors, that is, reciprocity, transparency, formal and informal communication 
(communication frequency), two-way and participative communication (communication 
efficacy), and cultural sensitivity, were proposed as factors influencing the building of 
trust among ISA partners (Hamel 1991; Kogut 1988; Mohr et al. 1996; Skarmeas et al. 
2002).  In the proposed model, five paths were significant: from utilization to ISA 
performance (H1b), from trust to integration (H4a), from trust to utilization (H4b), from 
transparency to trust (H6), and from trust to commitment (H11).  While modifying the 
model to develop more refined relationships between factors and a more parsimonious 
model, all of these exogenous factors were proposed as first order factors for the second 
order factor, alliance partnership interaction (API), in the final model.  The rationales 
behind this argument are that 1) the higher correlations between exogenous factors, 2) 
the higher correlations of each factor with trust, and 3) theoretical foundations regarding 
exogenous factors which can underlie one higher order factor based on the alliance and 
relationship marketing literature.  As expected, API positively influenced trust.  It is 
logical to think that ISA partners should have reciprocity, transparency, formal and 
informal frequent communication, two-way and participative communication, and 
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sensitivity towards different cultures to establish successful partnerships in order to 
achieve alliance objectives.   
In terms of relative contributions to trust among these factors, however, 
transparency accounted for the most significant contribution to trust and formal frequent 
communication contributed the least to trust.  Since an ISA involves at least two partners 
exchanging information, know-how, and ideas, ISA managers might think that the most 
important factor in developing a successful partnership would be exchanges without 
guile and distortion and that any activities, intentions, and behaviors between them 
should be easily understood by each partner in order to create a trusting relationship 
between them.  Though frequent formal communication positively contributed to the 
development of trust between ISA partners, its lesser contribution to trust compared to 
other exogenous factors suggests that ISA managers may put little emphasis on formal 
communication to develop trust.  Frequent formal communication can be viewed as 
hampering flexibility between alliance partners to adapt to changing partnership and 
market conditions (Fisher et al. 1997).  Other factors such as contingent exchanges of 
resources (reciprocity), feedback and input by partners (two-way communication), 
understanding different cultures (cultural sensitivity), joint decision making 
(participative communication), and frequent informal communication are more 
important to ISA partners in developing an ISA partnership than is frequent formal 
communication.   
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The Effects of Trust and Commitment and Desire for Joint Action (DJA) on ACE 
The second research question was to investigate how ISA partnership 
development affects the management of resources contributed by each partner.  ISAs are 
established to acquire resources from the partner firm and to utilize the resources from 
the partner in order to accomplish their objectives in the market.  It is, thus, important to 
explore how ISA partners effectively manage the resources contributed by its partner 
firm(s) to achieve their alliance objectives. 
Before discussing the effects of trust and commitment on ACE, three points are 
necessary to facilitate understanding of the test results.  The first is that both trust and 
commitment have been considered as important factors that give motivation to act 
together and bring positive joint action between alliance partners (Kumar et al. 1995; 
Morgan and Hunt 1995; Ruyter et al. 2001).  The second is the high correlation between 
trust and commitment (the correlation of .91), which indicates that trust and commitment 
are practically the same factor in this study although the two factors are distinctive by 
the CFA analysis.   Therefore, a higher order factor, desire for joint action (DJA), that 
could underlie trust and commitment was introduced.  The third is the introduction of a 
second order factor, alliance coordination effectiveness (ACE), for integration and 
utilization.  ACE had integration and utilization as first order factors because of the high 
correlation between integration and utilization (.70) and the coordination concept that 
can underline both integration and utilization.  Although both integration and utilization 
were identified as distinctive factors by use of the EFA and CFA, the high correlation 
between the two implies that one underlying dimension for both of them may exist.  This 
    
122
underlying dimension may be cooperative activities through which alliance partners try 
to effectively manage the resources they need to achieve alliance objectives.  Therefore, 
the second order factor, ACE, was proposed.  As expected, DJA significantly affected 
ACE in the final model.  ACE positively influenced the two financial performance 
measures.  The impacts of commitment on integration, utilization, and ACE were not 
significant in the proposed, first, and the second revised model.  The high correlation 
between trust and commitment might obscure the actual effect of commitment on those 
factors in these models.  However, in the final model, DJA positively influenced ACE in 
which both trust and commitment significantly contributed to DJA. 
ACE and ISA Performance 
The third research question was to investigate how ISA partners manage 
resources contributed by each partner and how this activity affects ISA performance.  
ISA partners share and exchange resources to create a resource base to accomplish their 
ISA objectives.  ISA partners need not only share and exchange their resources but also 
need to coordinate activities which capitalize on these resources to achieve their strategic 
goals.  To do this, cooperation to effectively manage resources provided by each partner 
is necessary.  As expected, ACE positively and significantly affected both ISA 
performance measures in the second and third revised and final model3 .  These positive 
effects indicate that ISA partners can achieve their alliance objectives, whether financial  
or non-financial performance, when they effectively coordinate (i.e., integrate and  
                                                          
3 In the proposed and first revised model, only utilization positively and significantly 
affected the two performance measures.  Integration did not significantly affect either 
measure of performance. 
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utilize) the resources provided by each partner. 
Moderating Effects of Host Government Interference and Technology Turbulence 
In addition to the three main objectives of this study, this study investigated 
whether market environment turbulence (i.e., host government interference and 
technology turbulence) can moderate the relationship between ACE and ISA 
performance. 
The ISA literature indicates that host government interference can affect the 
operation of foreign firms and ISAs in the host country (Calantone et al. 2003; Yan 
1998).  Yet, this study found that the interaction effects of ACE and host government 
interference on both ISA performance measures were not significant.  These non-
significant effects indicate that ACE is strong enough to absorb interferences by the host 
government and that ISA partners can still achieve their objectives by minimizing 
interferences when they effectively integrate and utilize the resources available to them.   
The interaction effects of ACE and technology turbulence on ISA performance 
were also not significant.  These non-significant interaction effects indicate that when 
ISA partners effectively manage their resources through integration and utilization, they 
can minimize the impact of technology turbulence on ISA operations.  Both the non-
significant effects suggest the strong direct impact of ACE on ISA performance.   
Mediating Effects of DJA and ACE 
Tests for the additional path analyses indicated that alliance partnership 
interaction (API) directly influences alliance coordination effectiveness (ACE).  Desire 
for joint action (DJA), therefore, partially mediated the relationship between API and 
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ACE.  This partial mediation effect of DJA suggests that the interactions between ISA 
partners specified in this study can directly influence the sharing, exchanging, and 
capitalizing on the resources between ISA partners.  The non-significant effects of DJA 
on both financial performance measures indicate that ACE mediates DJA to positively 
affect ISA performance. 
Implications 
The results reported in Chapter VI are significant because they explain how ISA 
partners should develop a trusting relationship to successfully manage ISA resources in 
order to achieve their objectives.  The original model was empirically tested and 
modified to more precisely investigate the research objectives based on the theoretical 
foundations and the relationships between factors specified in each model.  The 
modifications, through the introductions of higher order factors, provide more 
appropriate understanding and interpretation of the findings for the research questions in 
this study.  The findings have implications for both managerial practice and scholarly 
research as addressed below.   
Managerial Implications 
General implications for managerial practice largely come from the findings 
related to what factors are important to build trust in alliance relationships and how  
ISA partners should coordinate their activities in order to manage the resources 
contributed by each partner to achieve alliance objectives. 
Exogenous Factors and DJA.  In order to develop the relationship between ISA 
partners, ISA managers need to understand what factors are important in developing 
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interactive relationships.  Transparency is more likely to contribute to the development 
of ISA interaction relationships between ISA partners than any other factor.  This 
implies that informing each other of events or changes affecting ISA partners and 
exchange and delivery of information, ideas, and know-how without guile or distortion 
could be the most important factor in alliance partner interactions, which can positively 
promote an atmosphere in which ISA partners can build trust or commitment.  When 
ISA managers clearly understand activities, intentions, or responses of their partner(s), 
they are more likely to work together based on trust and commitment.  Two-way 
communication and cultural sensitivity are also relatively important factors.  Given that 
ISAs are formed to acquire and utilize each partner’s resources and carry out their 
strategies through coordination between the partners, ISA managers should stress the 
need to provide input to their partner(s) and get feedback from them.  The importance of 
cultural sensitivity implies that the understanding of different cultural practices in the 
operation of ISAs can be a positive alliance interaction, which helps ISAs work together 
based on trust and commitment. 
Another interesting finding arises from the low contribution of formal 
communication to API.  Particularly in ISA contexts, this low contribution implies that 
ISA managers may put less emphasis on formal communication than on any other 
interaction addressed in this study.  
The above findings suggest that ISA managers should 1) emphasize an ISA 
partnership in which each partner has a clear understanding of  the importance of being 
transparent, 2) promote an atmosphere of providing feedback or input to each other, and 
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3) develop a greater level of cultural understanding, in order to establish a higher level of 
joint working environment.  On the other hand, formal communication may need to be 
less emphasized with regard to promoting a better joint working environment between 
ISA managers. 
Trust, Commitment, and ACE.  Once ISA partners establish a joint working 
environment based on trust and commitment, they can better manage their resources.  
When ISA managers perceive that they have established a higher level of DJA between 
them, they are more likely to effectively integrate and utilize the resources provided by 
each partner.  Therefore, it might be desirable for ISA managers to establish DJA 
through positive interactions if they wish to effectively integrate their resources with 
those of their partners, resulting in a greater likelihood of effectively implementing their 
strategies based on the pooled resources. 
ACE and ISA Performance.  The positive effects of ACE on both ISA 
performance measures imply that ISA managers should understand the importance of 
coordinating activities between them.  They need to know how to share as well as 
exchange resources to create a resource base and how to harness the pooled resources to 
implement and successfully carry out their alliance strategies in the market.  When they 
understand how to coordinate their resource management activities, they can enhance the 
success of their alliance objectives. 
Research Implications 
 The insights obtained in this research generate several implications that can be 
applied to the ISA literature and to those who will investigate further the partnership 
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development processes in the relationship marketing area.  
 Many researchers have indicated that the ISA literature has not focused much on 
how ISA partners develop their relationships and how the partners can successfully 
accomplish their objectives (Gulati et al. 1994; Yan 1998).  This study integrated and 
synthesized various exogenous factors that could help ISA partners develop a 
relationship in which ISA partners can work together based on trust and commitment.  
The factors were extensively investigated and one higher order factor (API: alliance 
partnership interaction) that underlies all the factors was proposed and empirically tested 
related to other ISA relationship factors.  The results of this study regarding the relative 
contributions of the exogenous factors to DJA can provide researchers theoretical 
foundations by which the researchers can conceptualize the factors influencing the 
development of effective partnerships in various interorganizational contexts.  
The higher correlation between trust and commitment suggests the need for 
further examination of the relationship between trust and commitment.  Since trust and 
commitment have been addressed as separate and distinctive factors, marketing 
researchers need to clearly conceptualize trust and commitment in different research 
settings to understand whether they are practically the same or different factors and to 
what extent they are same or different.   
The concept of ACE was conceptually developed to provide the theoretical 
foundation for coordination processes related to resource management in an ISA context.   
The two related but different dimensions of ACE, i.e., integration and utilization, can 
provide a theoretical foundation for coordination related to effective resource 
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management in the alliance context.  By empirically demonstrating the importance of 
integration and utilization concepts, this study will encourage marketing researchers to 
explore these concepts in other interorganizational contexts. 
In order to empirically test exogenous factors, a number of new scales for these 
factors were developed (e.g., reciprocity, transparency, integration, and utilization).  
Although scale development was not a primary purpose of this research, the new scales 
could be used in subsequent research to substantiate the arguments proposed in this 
study.  Researchers can replicate these scales in different interorganizational relationship 
marketing areas, such as, buyer-seller relationships or domestic alliance relationships, 
thereby validating these scales.   
Although this research attempted to understand how ACE affects the financial 
and non-financial measures of ISA performance, it could not identify any significant 
differences in terms of the impact of ACE on these two measures.  Further research 
addressing the question of the differentiation of these two measures and how other 
independent factors might influence them would enrich the understanding of ISA 
performance. 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
Some of the possible limitations of this study are noted and addressed in this 
section.  The limitations, interestingly, provide several research opportunities for 
investigation.  
Response Rate 
The responses in the web survey were individuals who are/were involved in 
    
129
the international operations of their firms.  However, the response rate from the web 
survey was low (4.3%), generating only 143 responses, suggesting that the responses 
that were obtained might have been biased although non-response bias was not 
statistically identified.  The low response rate may have been caused by a long 
questionnaire (six pages) or by not clearly defining the target sample (i.e., the target 
sample was those who are/were involved in international operations of their firms).  If 
the target sample could have been chosen more precisely (i.e., those who are/were 
involved in ISAs) and the questionnaire had been shorter, the response rates may have 
been higher, which could have allowed the results of this study to be generalized to a 
broader population (Note: The relative higher response rate (14.1%) from Group 4, 
which consisted of alliance organization members, somewhat supports this argument).  
Additional research based on a larger sample size would possibly substantiate the 
findings of this study (e.g., as way of increasing the sample size and response rate, the 
researcher could attend an ISA- related conference and have attendees complete the 
survey instrument).   
One objective of this study was to find out whether there would be any 
differences in responses by those who are/were involved in equity ISAs and those 
involved in non-equity ISAs.  However, the small sample size of equity ISAs (N=38) 
prevented comparisons of the responses from them with those of non-equity ISAs 
through the use of SEMs.  Therefore, future research with a large sample of equity and 
non-equity ISAs would be helpful in learning whether there are any differences in their  
partnership development process and the impact of this development process on their  
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performance. 
Research Context   
One future research avenue related to ISAs is the investigation of the theoretical 
aspects addressed in this study in different types of alliances, such as, exploitation and 
exploration alliances (March 1991; Rothaermel 2001) or vertical and horizontal alliances 
(Rindfleish and Moorman 2003).  It would be interesting to investigate how ISA partners 
develop their relationships to accomplish their objectives in different types of ISAs.  
Since the objectives or formations of these alliances may differ, the partnership 
development processes may vary depending on the types of alliances.  Such research 
would extend and enrich the findings of this study. 
Another research avenue related to the research context is the partnership 
development process in different industries.  As indicated by Varadarajan and 
Cunningham (1995), the theories developed in this study could be applied to various 
industries in which ISAs are involved, such as, manufacturing or services or more 
specific industries (e.g., telecommunication, pharmaceutical, or hotel).  Questions that 
could be investigated are 1) how does the partnership evolve in different industries?  2) 
what partnership factors are the most important?  3) how do ISAs manage their resources 
in different industries?  4) how does the development and resource management in 
different industries affect ISA performance?  If ISAs are different in their partnership 
development and resource management, how are they different and why?  All of these 
questions will extend, verify or modify the findings of this study.  
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Methodological Issues 
Several measurement scales were developed specifically for this study (e.g., 
reciprocity, transparency, integration, and utilization).  Though these measurement 
scales showed acceptable levels of reliability and validity, they need to be replicated in 
different research settings in order to validate whether they can be applied to those 
settings.  Further research is especially required to refine the integration items.  This 
study used only two integration items because three out of the original five integration 
items loaded highly on utilization.  Therefore, before replicating and using integration 
scale items in other contexts, the scale items need to be developed and refined to 
correctly reflect the concept of integration as specified in this study. 
Another scale-item issue is the high correlation between trust and commitment.  
The high correlation between the two implies that the scale items need to be reexamined 
and refined before they are used in other research contexts so as not to cause any 
interpretation problems.  Because they have been identified as different concepts in past 
research, further examination and refinement of these items is necessary. 
Unit of Analysis 
The responses for this research came from only American managers.  The 
responses from only one partner side may not accurately reflect the partnership 
development processes after the ISA is established.  Because at least two country 
managers are involved in the operations of an ISA, it would be more realistic and 
perhaps informative to interpret the findings of a study when the responses came from 
all the mangers involved in the ISA.  Therefore, another research avenue would be to 
    
132
study the partnership development process and its performance implications from the 
multiple perspectives of different country ISA managers. 
Conclusion 
 
By developing and testing a model of partnership development and its 
implications for performance in an ISA context, this study added to the theoretical and 
managerial contributions to the growing ISA research stream.  The results show that 1) 
partnership interactions positively influence the building of an atmosphere in which ISA 
partners can act together based on trust and commitment, 2) the building of the 
cooperative atmosphere promotes effective management of resources contributed by 
each ISA partner through coordinated activities (i.e., integration and utilization), and 3) 
the coordinated activities positively influence ISA performance. 
In globalizing market situations, it is necessary for firms to cooperate with firms 
in other countries via alliances in order to remain competitive in the market.  It is 
expected that the theoretical foundations and managerial implications addressed in this 
study will contribute to enhancing the understanding of ISAs and might help to increase 
the number of ISAs that are considered to be successful.  
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Texas A&M University 
A Web Survey of International Strategic Alliances/Joint Ventures 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
This is a web survey for Young-Tae Choi's doctoral dissertation, which investigates how 
international (strategic) alliances (ISAs: international joint ventures, international joint 
marketing agreement, international licensing, etc.) effectively develop their partnerships and 
achieve their objectives. 
We would very much appreciate it if either you or another individual in your firm who knows 
the operations of your firm's ISAs would participate in this survey.  The survey will take 
approximately 10-15 minutes to complete.  Participation is voluntary and does not have any 
potential risk for you. Your responses will be held in strict confidence and all data will be 
aggregated prior to analysis.  In other words, neither you nor your firm will be identified in 
any discussions of the findings. 
In appreciation of your participation, a $2 per returned response will be donated to either 
UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund) or the American Cancer Society based on 
your preference. In addition, a summary of the results will be available to those who 
request it. 
We truly appreciate your completion of this survey. If you have any questions, please feel 
free to call (979) 845-6084 or email ytchoi@cgsb.tamu.edu. 
Sincerely, 
Young-Tae Choi                                                                Dr. Richard T. Hise 
Ph.D. Candidate in Marketing and                                    Professor of Marketing and 
Project Coordinator                                                           Project Advisor 
Phone: 979-845-6084                                                       Phone: 979-845-5807 
Email: ytchoi@cgsb.tamu.edu                                                 Email: dick-hise@tamu.edu 
Begin Survey  
Click here  
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Directions: In answering the following questions, please refer to the most recent 
international strategic alliance (ISA) for which you can evaluate whether or not 
the objectives established for it were achieved.  
 
Note:  
1. An international strategic alliance (ISA) is a cooperative interfirm organization 
between two or more different country firms to achieve their strategic objectives 
by pooling their resources or skills.  
2. The international strategic alliance still exists or no longer exists. 
1. Please indicate the type of international strategic alliance your firm was (is) involved in. Please 
check the one (either equity or non-equity) that best represents the type of international strategic 
alliance. 
1) International joint venture(equity international strategic alliance)   
2) Non-equity international strategic alliance(Licensing, Joint marketing, R&D collaboration, Supply agreement, Consortium, etc)   
If you chose number 1), approximately what is (was) your firm's equity share in the joint venture? 
% 
If you chose number 2), what specific type of non-equity international strategic alliance is (was) it 
(please check one) ? 
Licensing  
Joint marketing  
R&D collaboration  
Supply agreement  
Consortium  
Other  
 
Please select the number that best describes your international strategic alliance experience. 
Strongly                                                                                                                Strongly 
disagree                                                                                                                 agree   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Our firm and the partner 
firm(s) always pay each        
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other back when one party 
gets help from the 
other(s). 
There is a give and take 
relationship between our 
firm and the partner 
firm(s).  
       
If the partner firm(s) takes 
into account our firm's 
needs and wants, we will 
consider its needs and 
wants.  
       
Resource exchanges 
between the partner firms 
are fair. 
       
Our firm and the partner 
firm(s) deliver necessary 
information in an 
understandable manner to 
each other. 
       
Our firm and the partner 
firm(s) understand each 
other's intentions and 
behaviors. 
       
Our firm and the partner 
firm(s) always keep each 
other informed about 
events or changes that 
may affect the other party.  
       
It is expected that any 
information that might help 
the other party will not be 
withheld.  
       
Exchange of information 
between the partner firms 
takes place frequently in 
formal meetings.  
       
It is always possible to 
have a formal meeting with
the partner firm(s). 
       
Extensive formal        
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communications occur 
frequently between the 
partner firms. 
Exchange of information 
between the partner firms 
takes place frequently and 
informally(e.g., hallway 
talk, telephone, emails, 
etc). 
       
It is always possible to 
have an informal meeting 
with the partner firm(s). 
       
Extensive informal 
communications occur 
frequently. 
       
Our firm and the partner 
firm(s) provide a lot of 
timely feedback about 
each other's decisions and 
strategies. 
       
Our firm and the partner 
firm(s) always respond to 
each other's 
communications in a 
timely and effective 
manner. 
       
Our firm and the partner 
firm(s) encourage 
each other to express 
views fully and openly.  
       
Our firm and the partner 
firm(s) participate in 
alliance goal setting 
together.  
       
Our firm and the partner 
firm(s) are jointly involved 
in alliance planning efforts. 
       
Our firm and the partner 
firm (s) seek each other's 
advice and counsel 
concerning alliance market 
strategies. 
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Our firm and the partner 
firm(s) are sensitive to 
each other's culture and 
ways of doing business. 
       
Our firm and the partner 
firm(s) are willing to adapt 
to each other's ways of 
doing business. 
       
Our firm and the partner 
firm(s) work hard to 
familiarize ourselves with 
each other's culture. 
       
Different cultures from 
each partner's country 
are very much appreciated 
by the partner firm(s). 
       
The partner firm(s) never 
acts opportunistically for 
its own benefit. 
       
The partner firm(s) keeps 
the promises it makes to 
our firm. 
       
A high level of trust 
generally characterizes the
relationship with the 
partner firm(s).  
       
The partner firm(s) is 
trustworthy.        
Our firm and our partner 
firm(s) are very committed 
to each other.  
       
Our firm and the partner 
firm(s) are willing to 
dedicate whatever people 
and resources it takes to 
make this alliance a 
success. 
       
Our alliance deserves our 
maximum effort to 
maintain it. 
       
    
156
Our firm and the partner 
firm(s) really care about 
the fate of the alliance. 
       
 
 
Please select the number that best describes your opinion regarding resource management 
between your firm and your partner firm(s). 
Strongly                                                    Strongly 
disagree                                                       agree   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Our firm and the partner firm(s) share a lot of market 
information.        
Our firm and the partner firm(s) exchange a great deal of 
market information.        
Our firm and the partner firm(s) are cooperative in transferring 
necessary resources.        
Our firm's resources are well integrated with the partner firm's 
resources.        
The integration of each partner's resources is effectively 
facilitated between the partner firms.        
Our firm and the partner firm(s) efficiently allocate alliance 
resources.        
Our firm and the partner firms(s) give a high priority to the joint 
implementation of coordinated market strategies.        
Our firm and the partner firm(s) effectively capitalize on alliance 
resources.         
Our firm effectively implements its strategies with our partner 
firm(s).         
Decision-making processes regarding the effective use of 
alliance resources are well coordinated between our firm and 
the partner firm(s). 
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Please check the number that best describes various aspects of market(s) in which your alliance 
operates. 
Strongly                                                                                                     Strongly 
disagree                                                                                                       agree   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The host country government 
frequently intervenes in the 
operation of the ISA. 
       
The host country government 
frequently changes its policies 
about the ISA after the ISA 
was formed. 
       
ISA market strategies often 
have to be modified due to 
host government policy 
changes about the ISA. 
       
Host government policies 
favor the local firm partner.        
The technology in our industry 
changes rapidly.        
A large number of new 
product ideas have been 
made possible through 
technological breakthroughs in
our industry. 
       
Technological developments 
in our industry are major in 
scope. 
       
Technological changes 
provide numerous 
opportunities for our alliance. 
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The following questions are related to your firm's financial and non-financial objectives and 
performance. 
1. What was (were) the financial objective(s) your firm wanted the international strategic alliance to 
achieve?  Please check all that apply. 
Sales growth  
Market share  
Lower production cost  
Profitability  
Other   
 
2. What was (were) the non-financial objective(s) your firm wanted to achieve in the international strategic 
alliance?  Please check all that apply. 
Acquisition of partner technology  
Use of partner distribution channel(s)  
Acquisition and use of partner marketing skills    
Acquisition and use of partner's knowledge of foreign markets  
Improvement of product quality manufacturing process  
Improvement of product design  
Providing better service for customers  
Overcoming foreign government barriers  
Entering a new foreign market   
Other  
 
Strongly                                                      Strongly 
disagree                                                         agreeRegarding the above non-financial objective(s), 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Our firm has accomplished its non-financial objectives.        
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Our firm is satisfied with its non-financial performance.        
Overall, the strategic non-financial goals of our firm were 
successfully achieved.        
 
Please answer the following questions about you and your company.  Your answers will be used for statistical 
purposes only and will be kept strictly confidential. 
What are the approximate annual sales of your company? $   
What is the approximate percentage of sales from abroad?   % 
What is your current position?    
How long has (was) the international strategic alliance been operating? 
  years    
      months
How long did you work or have you been working (or involved) in this international 
strategic alliance? 
 years 
months 
 
 
 
Thanks you for your participation! Please select one of the following charities that you 
would like to donate a $2.00 from us in appreciation of your effort. 
American Cancer Society  
UNICEF(United Nations Children's Fund)  
 
Please provide your email address in the box below if you would like to receive a 
summary of this research.  
Your email address:  
Submit
 
Thank for your help and participation!! 
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CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS WITHOUT THE PARTIAL  
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Correlations, Means and Standard Deviations Among Exogenous Factors Without the Partial 
Disaggregation Approach 
 RC1 RC2 RC3 RC4 TP1 TP2 TP3 TP4 CW1 CW2 CW3 
C1 1           
RC2 0.454 1          
RC3 0.423 0.457 1         
RC4 0.311 0.552 0.396 1        
TP1 0.269 0.477 0.215 0.571 1       
TP2 0.291 0.418 0.279 0.601 0.678 1      
TP3 0.432 0.431 0.194 0.500 0.673 0.667 1     
TP4 0.395 0.466 0.263 0.431 0.548 0.492 0.573 1    
CW1 0.340 0.487 0.257 0.461 0.480 0.564 0.576 0.548 1   
CW2 0.382 0.415 0.255 0.459 0.648 0.525 0.606 0.599 0.638 1  
CW3 0.223 0.442 0.388 0.436 0.438 0.449 0.485 0.587 0.641 0.639 1 
CF1 0.157 0.134 0.055 0.093 0.270 0.307 0.394 0.242 0.389 0.301 0.224 
CF2 0.213 0.072 0.093 0.083 0.249 0.189 0.262 0.294 0.273 0.307 0.282 
CF3 0.219 0.132 0.044 0.127 0.330 0.373 0.483 0.285 0.418 0.305 0.219 
CI1 0.228 0.383 0.229 0.370 0.479 0.478 0.472 0.455 0.513 0.459 0.424 
CI2 0.262 0.263 0.216 0.303 0.453 0.408 0.411 0.360 0.462 0.513 0.448 
CI3 0.157 0.269 0.203 0.336 0.405 0.352 0.427 0.401 0.468 0.526 0.483 
CP1 0.218 0.265 0.132 0.244 0.383 0.413 0.425 0.481 0.580 0.423 0.470 
CP2 0.223 0.349 0.179 0.304 0.460 0.412 0.500 0.519 0.576 0.456 0.430 
CP3 0.302 0.446 0.293 0.428 0.494 0.495 0.541 0.468 0.605 0.553 0.509 
CS1 0.298 0.416 0.268 0.505 0.532 0.629 0.494 0.543 0.563 0.513 0.532 
CS2 0.383 0.440 0.284 0.547 0.567 0.619 0.567 0.535 0.530 0.581 0.440 
CS3 0.378 0.371 0.245 0.468 0.452 0.576 0.568 0.552 0.547 0.483 0.485 
CS4 0.444 0.443 0.345 0.477 0.440 0.556 0.578 0.554 0.523 0.546 0.466 
MEAN 4.161 4.87 5.519 5.087 5.179 4.914 4.63 5.26 4.303 4.667 5.216 
SD 1.834 1.68 1.406        1.48       1.378        1.586     1.572        1.582      1.627     1.487       1.377 
Note: RC=reciprocity, TP=transparency, CW=two-way communication, CF= formal communication, CI= informal communication,  
CP= participative communication, CS=cultural sensitivity 
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Correlations, Means and Standard Deviations Among Exogenous Factors Without the Partial 
Disaggregation Approach (Continued) 
 CF1 CF2 CF3 CI1 CI2 CI3 CP1 CP2 CP3 CS1 CS2 CS3 CS4 
RC1              
RC2              
RC3              
RC4              
TP1              
TP2              
TP3              
TP4              
CW1              
CW2              
CW3              
CF1 1             
CF2 0.385 1            
CF3 0.615 0.465 1           
CI1 0.164 0.122 0.365 1          
CI2 0.266 0.495 0.262 0.508 1         
CI3 0.279 0.167 0.308 0.707 0.652 1        
CP1 0.476 0.393 0.453 0.379 0.375 0.358 1       
CP2 0.478 0.387 0.493 0.394 0.389 0.402 0.831 1      
CP3 0.448 0.303 0.424 0.453 0.412 0.424 0.675 0.740 1     
CS1 0.251 0.224 0.289 0.411 0.426 0.349 0.463 0.454 0.520 1    
CS2 0.234 0.192 0.264 0.417 0.430 0.380 0.360 0.372 0.485 0.775 1   
CS3 0.286 0.199 0.368 0.377 0.331 0.350 0.449 0.477 0.542 0.690 0.724 1  
CS4 0.252 0.304 0.323 0.310 0.346 0.334 0.355 0.428 0.539 0.641 0.678 0.726 1 
MEAN 4.704 4.611    4.37 5.173 5.124 4.093 4.728 4.833 4.624 5.037 4.451 4.722 4.494 
SD 1.595 1.837 1.588 1.551 1.667 1.595 1.634 1.605 1.668 1.499 1.541 1.505 1.605 
Note: RC=reciprocity, TP=transparency, CW=two-way communication, CF= formal communication, CI= informal communication,  
    CP= participative communication, CS=cultural sensitivity 
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Correlation, Standard Errors, and T-Values Among Exogenous Factors Without 
the Partial Disaggregation Approach1 
 REC TRSP CTW CF CIF CP CS 
REC 1.00       
TRSP 0.79 1.00      
 (0.05)       
 15.99       
CTW 0.74 0.86 1.00     
 (0.06) (0.04)      
 12.94 23.55      
CF 0.23 0.57 0.52 1.00    
 (0.1) (0.07) (0.08)     
 2.36 7.95 6.87     
CIF 0.51 0.65 0.73 0.45 1.00   
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08)    
 6.54 11.02 14.13 5.54    
CP 47 0.65 0.71 0.68 0.54 1.00  
 (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)   
 6.16 11.91 13.92 11.68 8.11   
CS 0.73 0.83 0.77 0.43 0.54 0.58 1.00 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06)  
 13.37 22.78 17.27 5.5 7.98 9.69  
Note: REC=reciprocity, TRSP=transparency, CTW=two-way communication 
        CF=formal communication, CIF=informal communication,  
        CP=participative communication, CS=cultural sensitivity 
1 Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
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Correlations, Means, and Standard Errors Among Trust and Commitment 
Without the Partial Disaggregation Approach 
 TRST1 TRST2 TRST3 TRST4 CMIT1 CMIT2 CMIT3 CMIT4 
TRST1 1.000        
TRST2 0.628 1.000       
TRST3 0.645 0.780 1.000      
TRST4 0.639 0.767 0.911 1.000     
CMIT1 0.615 0.694 0.829 0.819 1.000    
CMIT2 0.662 0.608 0.691 0.706 0.741 1.000   
CMIT3 0.483 0.501 0.599 0.616 0.610 0.626 1.000  
CMIT4 0.518 0.650 0.778 0.751 0.826 0.714 0.663 1.000 
MEAN 3.852 4.784 4.889 5.056 4.735 4.346 5.204 5.185 
S.D 1.742 1.543 1.615 1.553 1.656 1.721 1.462 1.525 
Note: TRST= trust, CMIT= commitment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlation, Standard Error, and T-Value Among Trust and Commitment 
Without the Partial Disaggregation Approach1 
 Trust Commitment
Trust 1.00  
Commitment 0.91 1.00 
 (0.02)  
 48.52  
                        1Number in parenthesis indicates standard error 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
165
Correlations, Means, and Standard Errors Among Integration and 
Utilization Without the Partial Disaggregation Approach 
 INTEG1 INTEG2 UTIL1 UTIL2 UTIL3 UTIL4 UTIL5 
INTEG1 1.000       
INTEG2 0.924 1.000      
   UTIL1 0.490 0.533 1.000     
UTIL2 0.604 0.683 0.716 1.000    
UTIL3 0.541 0.606 0.812 0.772 1.000   
UTIL4 0.531 0.599 0.715 0.706 0.761 1.000  
UTIL5 0.546 0.628 0.715 0.734 0.809 0.762 1.000 
MEAN 4.630 4.448 4.235 4.457 4.370 4.531 4.309 
S.D 1.540 1.577 1.481 1.584 1.440 1.441 1.497 
 Note: INTEG=integration, UTIL=utilization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlation, Standard Error, and T-Value Among Integration and Utilization 
Without the Partial Disaggregation Approach1 
 Integration Utilization
Integration 1.00  
Utilization 0.68 1.00 
 (0.05)  
 14.81  
                                                    1Number in parenthesis indicates standard error 
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Correlations, Means, and Standard Errors Among Performance Factors 
Without the Partial Disaggregation Approach 
 FOP1 FOP2 FOP3 NFOP1 NFOP2 NFOP3 
FOP1 1.000      
FOP2 0.749 1.000     
FOP3 0.748 0.680 1.000    
NFOP1 0.665 0.523 0.516 1.000   
NFOP2 0.596 0.641 0.588 0.818 1.000  
NFOP3 0.661 0.547 0.558 0.896 0.849 1.000 
MEAN 4.189 3.994 4.521 4.767 4.528 4.622 
S.D. 1.673 1.602 1.709 1.458 1.523 1.502 
                Note: FOP=financial performance, NFOP=non-financial performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlation, Standard Error, and T-Value Among Performance Factors 
Without the Partial Disaggregation Approach1 
 
Financial 
Performance 
Non-financial 
Performance 
Financial 
Performance 1.00  
Non-financial 
Performance 
0.74 1.00 
 (0.04)  
 17.62  
                     1Number in parenthesis indicates standard error 
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Correlations, Means, and Standard Errors Among Control Variables 
 
                     Note: HGOV=host government interference, TECH=technology turbulence 
 
 
 
Correlation, Standard Error, and T-Value Among Control Variables1 
 Host Government Interference Technology Turbulence 
Host Government 
Interference 1.00  
Technology Turbulence -0.08 1.00 
 (0.08)  
 -0.99  
                                1 Number in parenthesis indicates standard error 
 
 
 HGOV1 HGOV2 HGOV3 HGOV4 TECH1 TECH2 TECH3 TECH4 
HGOV1 1.000        
HGOV2 0.697 1.000       
HGOV3 0.632 0.863 1.000      
HGOV4 0.452 0.455 0.442 1.000     
TECH1 -0.039 -0.078 0.025 -0.053 1.000    
TECH2 -0.124 -0.085 0.006 -0.059 0.662 1.000   
TECH3 -0.047 -0.101 -0.020 0.042 0.596 0.775 1.000  
TECH4 -0.054 -0.069 -0.016 -0.018 0.534 0.721 0.768 1.000 
MEAN 2.358 2.167 2.333 3.494 4.838 4.925 4.869 4.801 
S.D 1.754 1.557 1.600 1.909 1.762 1.659 1.654 1.701 
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Factor Loadings Among Each Indicator and a Factor 1a 1 
 REC  TP  CF  CIF  CTW  CP  CS  TRST 
REC1 6.89 TP1 12.14 CF1 8.29 CIF1 10.04 CTW1 11.12 CP1 13.40 CS1 12.89 TRST1 9.72 
REC2 10.05 TP2 11.61 CF2 6.50 CIF2 9.17 CTW2 11.08 CP2 15.45 CS2 13.75 TRST2 12.51 
REC3 7.41 TP3 12.17 CF3 9.65 CIF3 13.8 CTW3 11.14 CP3 11.39 CS3 12.81 TRST3 16.29 
REC4 8.13 TP4 8.88         CS4 11.73 TRST4 15.94 
Note: REC=reciprocity, TP=transparency, CF=formal communication, CIF=informal communication, CTW=two-way  
          communication, CP=participative communication, CS=cultural sensitivity, TRST=trust 
 
 
Factor Loading Among Each Indicator and a Factor 1b1 
 CMIT  INTEG  UTIL  FOP  NFOP  HGI  TECH 
CMIT1 14.42 INTEG1 15.46 UTIL1 13.41 FOP1 14.02 NFOP1 15.41 HGI1 10.43 TECH1 9.69 
CMIT2 12.2 INTEG2 17.09 UTIL2 12.94 FOP2 12.24 NFOP2 14.1 HGI2 15.83 TECH2 13.71 
CMIT3 10.2 INTEG3 9.16 UTIL3 15.34 FOP3 12.22 NFOP3 16.45 HGI3 14.11 TECH3 14.07 
CMIT4 14.53 INTEG4 7.86 UTIL4 12.99   NFOP4  HGI4 6.42 TECH4 12.67 
  INTEG5 8.34 UTIL5 13.82         
Note: CMIT=commitment, INTEG=integration, UTIL=utilization, FOP= financial performance, NFOP=non-financial  
         performance, HGI=host government interference, TECH=technology turbulence 
1  Numbers represent t-value between each indicator and a factor 
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